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Fighting Spam
How Tough is the Canadian Legal Arsenal?
An Analysis in the Light of the U.S. CAN-SPAM Act
Serge Kablan*
Abstract
Following several countries, Canada recently passed Canada’s Anti-Spam
Legislation (CASL), in an attempt to tackle spam. The law aims to ‘‘protect
Canadians while ensuring that businesses can continue to compete in the global
marketplace”. For this purpose, CASL prohibits not only the sending of commercial
electronic messages without consent, but also any alteration of transmission data in
the course of a commercial activity. Moreover, the Act disallows the installation of
a computer program on another person’s computer system and the sending of
commercial electronic messages following the installation. These three activities are
prohibited unless the author or initiator has obtained the recipient’s prior consent,
either express or implied. This opt-in approach contrasts with the U.S. CAN-
SPAM Acts opt-out regime, in force since 2004, which is known to offer to senders
the chance to initiate contact and to recipients the option to unsubscribe or reject
any subsequent commercial electronic message. Our paper intends to demonstrate
that, notwithstanding the apparent difference in their respective approach, CASL
and U.S. CAN-SPAM Act remain fundamentally similar in practical effect. This
resemblance is good news, considering the profile and proximity of Canadian and
American e-commerce economies. Thus, in spite of its detail and complexity, CASL
may not be the most stringent anti-spam act as claimed, certainly not with the
challenges related to its implementation and enforcement.
INTRODUCTION
In its 2014 Internet Security Threat Report, the Symantec Corporation1 had
estimated that for 2013 alone (that is, at the time Canada was on the verge of
enacting its anti-spam legislation) 29 billion spams was being sent daily in the
world. The overall email spam rate was 66 per cent (this percentage dropped to
* Professor, FSA, Université Laval, Québec, Canada (serge.kablan@fsa.ulaval.ca). The
author thanks the Office of Research and Creation (Université Laval), Joy Audet, and
the CJLT’s anonymous reviewer for their invaluable assistance in the production of this
article. All the electronic citations are updated as of July 4, 2018.
1 Symantec Corporation, Internet Security Threat Report 2014, vol 19 (April 2014) at 14-
15, online: <www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b-istr_-
main_report_v19_21291018.en-us.pdf >[ISTR 2014]; Internet Security Threat Report
2018, vol 23 (March 2018) at p. 73, online: <www.symantec.com/content/dam/
symantec/docs/reports/istr-23-2018-en.pdf>.
54.6 in 2017, according to the corporation’s 2018 report). To counter this
nuisance, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) raised international cooperation and legislative harmonization as item
No. 8 of its Anti-Spam Toolkit,2 since spam shares attributes of cyberspace and,
notably, makes light work of territoriality.3 International cooperation and
legislative harmonization are fundamental to the direction of the OECD to
ensure that the laws to be enacted locally are effective.4 According to the
organization’s guidelines, these laws should be concise and simple, and ‘‘put in
place an effective sanction regime and appropriate standards of proof.”5
The 2001 Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, which several non-member
states of the Council of Europe, including Canada and the U.S., have signed,
seeks to harmonize the rules regarding certain aspects of harmful cyberspace
practices, such as computer forgery and computer fraud.6 But the challenge of
harmonization remains, and the absence of a comprehensive international
instrument is not expected to alleviate states’ need for homogeneity.7 The
Canadian anti-spam legislation should be tested from this perspective while, at
the same time, one appreciates the severity of the solutions it puts in place. This
law, entitled, An Act to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian
economy by regulating certain activities that discourage the exercise of commercial
activities electronically and to amend the Canadian Radio-television
Telecommunications Commissions Act, the Competition Act, the Personal
Information Protect ion and Electronics Document Act and the
2 OECD, Joint ICCP-CCP Task Force on Spam, Anti-Spam Toolkit of Recommended
Policies and Measures, Doc. No. DSTI/CP/ICCP/SPAM (2005)3 (2006 at 17 [OECD].
The organization’s attention to spam is not an accident. It is motivated by spam’s
mutation, since spammers have gradually shifted from the initial purely advertising
function of spam to a pervasive channel that paves the way for all sorts of illicit
operations (fraud, spread of computer worms or viruses, propagation of malicious
content, network alteration, etc.).
3 On the nature of cyberspace and the role of law, see Serge Kablan & Arthur Oulaı̈,
‘‘L’essence des approches du droit cyberspatial et l’opportunité de la co-régulation”
(2009) 39 RGD 5.
4 The OECD shows the 8 elements of the Toolbox against spam: Element I: Regulatory
Approaches; Element II: Enforcement; Element III: Industry-driven initiatives; Element
IV: Technical Measures; Element V: Education and Awareness initiatives; Element VI:
Cooperative partnerships; Element VII: Spam metrics; Element VIII: Global coopera-
tion; OECD, supra note 2 at 73.
5 Ibid. at 25.
6 Council ofEurope,Convention onCybercrime, 23November 2001,ETSNo. 185 at ss. 7-8
(entered into force 1 July 2004).
7 See, e.g., Pierre Trudel, FranceAbran&Gabriel Dupuis,Analyse du cadre réglementaire
québécois et étranger à l’égard du pourriel, de l’hameçonnage et des logiciels espions,
Rapport préparé pour la Direction des politiques du ministère des Services gouverne-
mentaux du Québec, Montréal, Chaire L.R. Wilson sur le droit des technologies de
l’information et du commerce électronique (2007); Arminda Bepko, ‘‘A State-by-State
Comparison of Spam Laws” (2003-2004) Media L & Poly 20.
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Telecommunications Act (hereinafter, CASL)8 allows Canada to catch up to
other G7 countries in terms of legislative initiatives against spam.9
In fact, CASL is the culmination of a process that began in 2004 and
involved Industry Canada10 Working Group on spam (known as the ‘‘Spam
Task Force”). The final report of the Working Group, released in May 2005,
concluded that spam legislation was needed.11 Bill C-27, which then became C-
28, and most recently CASL,12 implements this recommendation.
CASL has been in effect since July 2014.13 At first sight, it appears
particularly restrictive. The purpose of the Act is to promote e-commerce.14 The
way in which this is achieved is addressed in this article. More specifically, we
examine the strength of the rules that intend to discourage infringements on the
easy flow of communication and thereby support electronic commercial
activities. The review we undertake puts into perspective the OECD
guidelines.15 In addition, the U.S. CAN-SPAM Act, in force since January 1,
2004,16 will be considered, since Canada’s e-commerce involves its American
neighbour: as a matter of fact, the 2016 Canada Post whitepaper indicates that 53
8 S.C. 2010, c. 23 [CASL].CASL stands for ‘‘Canada’sAnti-SpamLegislation.” In its 2017
report, the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology acknowledged
that ‘‘[b]usinesses often fail to realize that theAct applies to thembecause their personnel
do not think of their communications as ‘‘spam.” By underlining spam rather than
electronic commerce and communications, the name under which the Act is commonly
known exacerbates this problem.” [citations omitted] Thus, the committee recommends
that ‘‘the Government of Canada [. . .] replace the phrase ‘Canada’s Anti-Spam
Legislation’ by the short title ‘Electronic Commerce Protection Act’ and the acronym
‘CASL’ by the acronym ‘ECPA’ in all guidance and enforcement materials as well as
other publications on every support, including fightspam.gc.ca.” See House of
Commons, Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Canada’s Anti-
Spam Legislation: Clarifications Are in Order, (December 2017) at 5, 11 (Chair: Dan
Ruimy).
9 Canada, Library of Parliament, ‘‘Legislative Summary of Bill C-28: An Act to promote
the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy by regulating certain activities
that discourage the exercise of commercial activities electronically,” by Alyssa Davies &
Thomas J. Terrence, Publication No. 40-3-C28-F, revised 15 November 2012 (Ottawa:
Library of Parliament, 2010) at 2-3.
10 Now Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED).
11 Industry CanadaWorking Group on Spam, Stopping Spam: Creating a Stronger, Safer
Internet (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 2005) at 3.
12 See the progress of the bill by consulting the database LEGISinfo, online: <www.parl.-
ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?billId=4543582&Mode=1&View=0&Langua-
ge=E>.
13 The provisions dealing with the installation of computer programs came into force on 15
January 2015. Those concerning the private right of action are not yet in force at the time
of publication of this article.
14 CASL, supra note 8, s. 3.
15 OECD, supra note 2.
16 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, 15
U.S.C. 37701-7713 (2004) [CAN-SPAM Act].
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per cent of Canadian online shoppers had made at least one cross-border
purchase in 2015 (83 per cent had purchased from the U.S.).17 On occasion, we
will reference Australian law,18 which is often presented as a model for the battle
against spam.19 The review will be conducted in two parts: (1) in light of the
requirements and prohibitions introduced by CASL, and (2) in relation to the
requirement of consent. In conclusion, we will briefly consider the recourses and
penalties faced by offenders.
1. THE REQUIREMENTS AND PROHIBITIONS
CASL regulates three activities: first, the sending of commercial electronic
messages (‘‘CEMs”) (1.1); second, the alteration of transmission data (1.2); and,
third, the installation of computer programs (1.3).
1.1 The Rules for Commercial Electronic Messages
At issue from the outset is the meaning to be given to the phrase CEMs.20
There is a double challenge to this, according to the OECD. One is related to the
form or medium of CEMs; the other concerns their nature.21 The first step is to
determine whether a technology neutral approach should be favored or, if the
law should target messages sent via specific technologies (or by specific methods,
to use the expression of the International Telecommunications Union).22 The
first option has the advantage of being inclusive, in addition to widening the
scope of the law. However, this option should not mean absolute neutrality, as
the OECD believes:
[. . .] even with a technology neutral approach, it is worthwhile to
evaluate which particular messaging media are being misused or have a
strong potential to be misused in the future and ensure that they are
appropriately addressed in the legislation.23
About the nature of the messages, it must be decided whether or not to
emphasize the commercial dimension. Under one option, the scope of the law is
17 See Canada Post, ‘‘Growing E-commerce in Canada: Unlocking the online shopper
opportunity,” (2016) at 8, online: <www.canadapost.ca/web/assets/pdf/blogs/canada-
p o s t - g r o w i n g - e - c o mm e r c e - i n - c a n a d a - 2 0 1 6 _ e n . p d f ? e c i d= d i s -
play%7Cpdn%7Ccs%7C104>.
18 Spam Act 2003, (Cth).
19 Debates of the Senate—Official Report, 39th Parl 2nd sess, vol 144:59 (13 May 2008) at
1329 [Debates of the Senate].
20 Derek E Bambauer, ‘‘A Comparative Analysis of Spam Laws: The Quest for a Model
Law” (Background paper for the ITU WSIS Thematic Meeting on Cybersecurity,
Geneva, Switzerland, 28 June—1 July 2005) Doc CYB/03 at 12.
21 OECD, supra note 2 at 26.
22 ITU, supra note 20.
23 OECD, supra note 2 at 26. See for example the review of the rules governing the use of
cookies (Part 2.1.3 of this article).
342 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [16 C.J.L.T.]
narrower, but this does not prevent it from regulating a number of the current
harms;24 under the second option, the scope is more likely to raise constitutional
concerns, notably related to the freedom of expression.25 The choice of the
Canadian government is revealed by analyzing the type of messages CASL
intends to capture (1.1.1), the conditions it sets for sending these messages
(1.1.2), and the situations excluded from these conditions (1.1.3).
1.1.1 The Targeted Messages
The CEM subject to CASL is the electronic message which has as its purpose
or one of its purposes, the encouragement of participation in a commercial
activity (Section 1(2)). By design, the Act does not indicate a particular
technology that gives the message its electronic character. An electronic message
is merely a message that is sent by any means of telecommunication (s. 1(1)). It is
understandable that the Canadian government intended to follow the
recommendations of the Spam Task Force, which encouraged such neutrality,
and suggested that CEMs be considered as a whole (text, sound, voice, visual
messages, etc.), including messages that come from the wireless communications
sector.26
Under U.S. law, the commercial electronic mail message (hereinafter,
‘‘CEMM”) refers to a message sent to a single electronic mail address.27 It was
feared that this clarification of the support or technology of the message would
force courts to rule on new media on an ongoing basis, unless the government
committed to a gradual widening of the scope of the law, updating it regularly as
new media emerged. However, case law has avoided this need. In the case of
MySpace, Inc., v. Wallace,28 it was alleged that advertisements from MySpace
pages do not constitute CEMMs under the CAN-SPAM Act. The plaintiff
submitted that the defendant had compromised 340,000 user accounts or
MySpace profiles and sent some 400,000 spam messages to those network
members. The defendant argued that these messages did not fall within the
current scope of the Act, since the Act presupposed an e-mail address. It
maintained that the addresses to which the MySpace messages were routed
(inboxes within the MySpace network) did not have the required format of the
domain name, which includes a string of characters such as user@domain.com.
In fact, s. 7702(5) of the CAN-SPAM Act does specifically refer to this
characteristic,29 but the electronic mail address is interpreted broadly. According
24 See, for example: Adam Massof, ‘‘Spam—Oy, What a Nuisance!” (2004) 2 BTLJ 1.
25 OECD, supra note 2 at 26. See also: Karen Ng, ‘‘Spam Legislation in Canada:
Federalism, Freedom of Expression and the Regulation of the Internet” (2005) 2 U
Ottawa L&Tech J 447.
26 Working Group on Spam, supra note 11 at 21.
27 CAN-SPAM Act, supra note 16 ss. 7702(2)(A), 7702(2)(C), 7702(6).
28 MySpace, Inc., v.Wallace, 498 F. Supp.2d 1293 (C.D. Cal. 2007) [Wallace].
29 CAN-SPAMAct, supra note 16, ss. 7702(5): ‘‘The term ‘electronicmail address’means a
destination, commonly expressed as a string of characters, consisting of a unique user
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to the U.S. District Court of Central California, the electronic mail address
designates any destination to which an electronic mail can be sent. As a
consequence, reference in s. 7702(5) to the standard format of the electronic mail
address and the domain name would essentially be indicative only. The court was
of the view that the government had not intended to restrict this provision, aware
as it was of the state of the art in technology and of the outlook for its
development.30 The broad interpretation this court adopted was echoed in the
judgment of Facebook Inc. v. MaxBounty Inc.,31 and elsewhere,32 leaving few
dissimilarities with the Canadian law, where the approach that advocates
regulation according to technology was rejected in favour of an expansive and
more neutral approach.
As a further matter, to be subject to the CAN-SPAM Act, the primary
purpose of the CEMM must be commercial. The primary purpose is commercial
when the message is exclusively commercial advertising or promotes a product or
service. If the message includes other content (for example when the message
encompasses content that is transactional or relational, in addition to
promotional content),33 the recipient must reasonably interpret the subject line
of the message to determine if its primary purpose is commercial. In the cases
where the message conveys material other than transactional or relational
content, in addition to promotional content, not only can the subject line of the
message be interpreted to determine its nature, but the body of the message may
also be taken into consideration.34
Unlike U.S. law, the Canadian legislation is not expressly related to the
primary purpose of the message. Its scope seems to be much broader, since CASL
targets messages which have as their purpose, or one of their purposes, the
encouragement of participation in a commercial activity. In determining whether
this purpose is present in the message, reasonable consideration must be given to
internal and external elements of the message. The content of the message or any
website or other database to which the message gives access, are expressly recited
in s. 1(2). The information about a contact person referred to in the message may
also indicate a commercial purpose. One must emphasize the following point: in
themselves, these elements of s. 1(2) do not seem essential.35 What is decisive is
the expected action from the recipient, that he or she participates in a certain
commercial activity. This interpretation emerges more explicitly from the U.S.
name ormailbox (commonly referred to as the ‘local part’) and a reference to an Internet
domain (commonly referred to as the ‘domain part’), whether or not displayed, to which
an electronic mail message can be sent or delivered.”
30 Wallace, supra note 28 at 1300.
31 Facebook, Inc. v.MaxBounty, Inc., 274 F.R.D. 279 (N.D. Cal. 2011) at paras. 238-284.
32 Joffe v. Acacia Mortg. Corp , 211 Ariz. 325 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
33 See CAN-SPAM Act, supra note 16, s. 7702(17(A).
34 See Primary purpose, 16 CFR s. 316.3 (2008).
35 ITU, supra note 20.
344 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [16 C.J.L.T.]
CAN-SPAM Act, which mentions the same elements and may have inspired the
Canadian provision:
The inclusion of a reference to a commercial entity or a link to the
website of a commercial entity in an electronic mail message does not,
by itself, cause such a message to be treated as a commercial electronic
mail message for purposes of this Act if the contents or circumstances
of the message indicate a primary purpose other than commercial
advertisement or promotion of a commercial product or service.36
CASL provides a non-exhaustive list of CEMs that are intended to
encourage participation in a commercial activity (s. 1(2)(a)-(c)).37 This is the
case for messages involving an offer to buy, sell, barter, or lease a product, good,
or service, and for messages that offer, announce or promote a potential
business, investment or transaction. For purposes of s. 1(2)(d), the electronic
message which ‘‘promotes a person” by representing him or her as a person who
performs or has the intention to perform the enumerated acts, also has this
commercial nature. An electronic message that includes a request for consent to
send a CEM is likewise considered to be commercial (s. 1 (3)). As such, it is
prohibited, unless the sender has previously obtained the recipient’s consent. The
parliamentary proceedings highlight the impasse created by this rule of prior
consent. This rule represents one of the main differences with the U.S. model,
which offers senders a chance to initiate contact and recipients the option to
reject commercial electronic messages thereafter.38 In the opinion of some
parliamentarians, implementing s. 1(3) would put a merchant in an impossible
situation:
That, unfortunately, raises what I would call a catch 22. No one can
send a message without getting consent and no one can send a message
asking for consent because that would be a commercial message.39
Thus, the means of contact available to Canadian companies would be limited:
‘‘Anyone who wishes to establish a business relationship with another person
must now do so via the telephone or mail, or meet the individual in person. They
could not send a simple email.”40
It is worth recalling the Belgian solution in this respect:
36 CAN-SPAM Act, supra note 16, s. 7702(2)(D).
37 The Australian legislation specifically targets 12 activities. It provides, however, that
other activities couldbe included in theRegulations. See:SpamAct 2003, supranote 18, s.
6.
38 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology,
Proceedings of the House and its committees, 40th Leg, 3rd sess, No. 43 (2 November
2010) at 3 (Andre Leduc). See, e.g., CAN-SPAMAct, supra note 16, s. 7704(a)(4). Also,
SylviaMercadoKierkegaard, ‘‘War Against Spam:AComparative Analysis of theU.S.
and the European Legal Approach” (2005) 2 Communications of the IIMA 47 at 52.
39 House of Commons Debates, 40th Parl, 2nd sess, vol 144, No. 53 (7 May 2009) at 3249
(Derek Lee).
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[R]egulatory authorities [. . .] consider that a request for consent may be
addressed by electronic mail. They rely on the fact that the Act requires
prior consent solely in the case of electronic mail sent for advertising
purposes. An electronic mail message whose purpose is to seek consent
is not by definition an advertisement and therefore it would not be
subject to the requirement of prior consent.41
Moreover, beyond what is enumerated in s. 1(2) and (3) of CASL, one might
well question the exact criterion which qualifies an activity and thus an electronic
message as commercial. As suggested earlier, it may be appropriate to take
account of intrinsic and extrinsic elements of the message, but it remains difficult
to know under which principles these elements should be evaluated. CASL is
silent on this matter. The idea of commercial activity is nevertheless a central
feature of the law, for obvious reasons. First, because it restricts the reach of the
Act. If the statute had targeted electronic messages in general, freedom of
expression would have likely suffered disproportionately. But the OECD warns:
‘‘Limiting the scope of spam legislation to commercial messages only may lead to
the omission of most harmful spam. For example, a million spam messages
promoting a political or religious idea can be as invasive and disturbing as a
million messages promoting an herbal remedy.”42 Second, by emphasizing
electronic messages that promote participation in a commercial activity, the
Canadian federal parliament avoids potential constitutional challenges to its
legislative authority, since it has jurisdiction in the area of trade and commerce.43
That being said, CASL assumes the commercial nature of the transactions
listed in s. 1(2) and (3), without engaging in any definition of their
‘‘commerciality.” Similarly, s. 1(1) merely states that transactions with a
commercial nature (such as those listed) fall within the scope of CASL,
regardless of whether or not they are carried out44 with the purpose of making a
profit.45 The scope of CASL is thereby fully expanded, reaching almost all
40 House of Commons Debates, 40th Parl, 2nd sess, vol 144, No. 105 (2 November 2009) at
6477 (Robert Vincent).
41 Arthur Oulaı̈, « La place du consentement dans l’encadrement de la cyberpublicité au
Canada » in Pierre-Claude Lafond, ed,La publicité, arme de persuasionmassive : les défis
de l’encadrement législatif (Cowansville : Éditions Yvon Blais 2012) 123 at 155 [free
translation].
42 OECD, supra note 2 at 26-27.
43 Canada, Innovation, Science and EconomicDevelopment, Bill C-28 (Ottawa: 2010) at 1
(unpublished) [ISED].
44 Where conducted by a ‘‘person,” person within the meaning of s. 1(1) of CASL, supra
note 8, is any ‘‘natural person, partnership, corporation, organization, association,
trustee, executor, liquidator of a succession, administrator, receiver or legal representa-
tive.”
45 The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 3
[PIPEDA] also evokes the notion of ‘‘commercial activity.” Its definition is not far from
that of CASL, with some exceptions (e.g. fundraising, which enjoys special treatment in
CASL). For the purposes of this Act, a commercial activity is ‘‘any regular activity and
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organizations (when engaging in a commercial activity),46 including provincial
and federal Crown corporations.47
Under European law, the wording seems more precise. For example, the
Parliamentary directive on privacy and electronic communications48 regulates
unsolicited communications for direct marketing purposes.49 In transposing s. 13
of that directive, which prohibits this type of communication when the persons to
whom it is addressed have not previously agreed to receive it, s. 22 of the French
Law regarding Confidence in the Digital Economy (hereinafter, ‘‘LEN”)50 gives
the meaning of direct marketing: ‘‘[d]irect marketing is the sending of any
message intended to promote, directly or indirectly, goods, services or the image
of a person selling goods or providing services.” The European directive on
electronic commerce may also be mentioned. This instrument refers to
commercial communication to mean ‘‘any form of communication intended to
promote, directly or indirectly, goods, services, or the image of a company,
organization or person having a commercial, industrial or craft activity or
pursuing a regulated profession.”51 Perhaps a similar wording, or wording
modelled after the U.S. anti-spam law (which targets commercial advertising or
promotion of products or services), would have allowed a clearer distinction
between electronic messages subject to CASL, the sending of which must meet
the specific conditions analyzed below, and messages that escape these
any isolated act of a commercial character in nature, including the selling, bartering or
leasing of donor lists, membership or collection fund” (s. 2(1)).
46 ISED, supra note 43. For purposes of CASL however, commercial activity does not
relate to an act or transaction that is performed with a view to the following four
objectives: compliance with the law, public safety, protection of Canada or conduct of
international affairs and defense (s. 1(1) and (4)).
47 Section 4 of CASL, supra note 8, for example, stipulates that ‘‘This Act is binding on any
corporation that is expressly declared by or under any Act of Parliament or of the
legislature of a province to be an agent of HerMajesty, when the corporation is acting as
such in the course of any commercial activity.”
48 EC,Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic
communications sector, [2002] OJ, L 201/37. See also EC, Directive 2009/136/EC of the
European Parliament of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal
service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services,
Directive 2002/58/ECon the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the
electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 on cooperation
between national authorities responsible for the implementation of the legislation on
consumer protection, [2009] OJ, L 337/11.
49 EC Directive 2002/58/EC, supra note 48, see, e.g., paras. 40-42.
50 Loi no. 2004-575 du 21 June 2004 pour la confiance dans l’economie numérique, ss. 13.1,
13.3. JO, 22 June 2004, 11168 [LEN] [free translation].
51 Certain communications are excluded. See especially EC, Directive 2000/31/EC of the
European parliament and theCouncil of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the InternalMarket, [2000]OJ,L 178
at ss. 7, 2(f).
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requirements. Without criteria other than the generic terms commercial activity,
the enumerative approach of CASL necessarily leaves uncertainties.52
1.1.2 Conditions for Sending Messages
A first prohibition concerns spam or unsolicited electronic messages (it
should be noted that the word spam is not used in the Act). Section 6(1) of CASL
makes it illegal to send a CEM to an electronic address,53 except with prior
consent of the recipient and on condition that the sender provides information
about its identity and an unsubscribe mechanism. The Act considers a CEM to
be sent once the transmission of the message is initiated, regardless of whether or
not the electronic address to which it is sent exists and whether or not the
message reaches the desired destination (s. 6(4)). The challenges underlying the
international dimension of CEMs appear clearly here, notably as to what extent
spammers operating from foreign countries are subject to the prohibition of s.
6(1) of CASL. In one of the texts initially debated, Bill S-235, the drafters tried to
address the issue and counter what they perceived as a weakness in anti-spam
laws, by targeting the person who ultimately benefits financially from the
CEM.54 The financial benefit and the presumption it implies were not formally
inserted into the final version of CASL, except partially, for determining the
amount of the penalty for violations.55 Perhaps the Act has nevertheless adopted
the spirit, since s. 6(1) focuses not only on the person who sends the CEM, but
also on the person who allows such a message to be sent. Even with this, one
wonders how CASL would tackle situations where the beneficiary of the mailing
or the financial interest is abroad. How will that person be identified and then
punished for any offence, since its actions also technically bring the Canadian
anti-spam law into play? Indeed, like the Australian law,56 CASL applies
52 Oulaı̈, supra note 41 at 153.
53 It isworth clarifying that the electronic address towhichCASL refers receives a relatively
broad definition and avoids the description of the CAN-SPAM Act. Here, electronic
address (in digital, alphabetical, or alphanumeric form) includes any address of an e-
mail, instant message, telephone account, or any other ‘‘similar account” (s. 1(1)). The
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) explains
that ‘‘similar accounts” may include new media if a review in practice reveals
characteristics other than those of broadcast media: ‘‘Whether a ‘similar account’ is
an electronic address depends on the specific circumstances of the account in question.
For example, a typical advertisement placed on a website or blog post would not be
captured. In addition, whether communication using social media fits the definition of
‘electronic address,’ must be determined on a case-by-case basis, depending upon, for
example, how the specific social media platform in question functions and is used. For
example, a Facebook wall post would not be captured. However, messages sent to other
users using a social media messaging system (e.g., Facebook messaging and LinkedIn
messaging), would qualify as sending messages to ‘electronic addresses.’” See ISED,
supra note 43 at 10.
54 See Spam Act 2003, supra note 18, ss. 7, 16.
55 See, e.g., CASL, supra note 8, s. 20(3)(e).
56 See: Spam Act 2003, supra note 18, ss. 7, 16.
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whenever the computer system57 used to access the electronic message is located
in Canada,58 whether or not the sender or the beneficiary is operating from a
foreign country.
It is true that the U.S. law prohibits unsolicited electronic messages a
posteriori, or after the recipient has expressed his or her objection to receiving
further messages. But the legislation is no less interested in the initiator of the
messages. As a matter of fact, this prohibition ex post focuses on the person
whose product, service or website is advertised or promoted by the CEMM and
who identified the recipients and provided their electronic mail addresses. The
U.S. reasoning uses the notion of protected computer,59 which also raises the
international issue of spam. In the CAN-SPAM Act, the term has the meaning of
s. 1030(e)(2)(B) of title 18 of the United States Code.60
Section 6(1) of CASL prohibits the sending of CEMs to electronic addresses
unless certain substantive and procedural requirements are met.
1.1.2.1 The Substantive Conditions
CASL raises two substantive issues: (a) foremost, the necessity for consent,
and (b) the content of CEMs.
(a) Prior Consent of the Recipient
Under CASL, any person to whom a CEM is sent must have previously
agreed to receive it. This is the approach referred to as opt-in. The recipient can
give his or her consent expressly, and in some cases, consent can be implied (s.
6(1)(a)). Both the European Directive on privacy and electronic communications
and the Australian Spam Act have this requirement,61 but not the U.S. CAN-
SPAMAct which uses the opt-out model. In that model, the recipient’s consent is
presumed and remains as long as he or she does not withdraw.62 The
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has drawn attention to some
57 CASL, supranote 8, s. 1(1) adopts thedefinition set out in s. 342.1(2) of theCriminalCode
of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 on the computer, which is envisaged as a ‘‘device or
group of devices connected or related to each other, which one or more of them: a)
contains computer programs or other computer data; b) pursuant to computer
programs, (i) performs logic and control functions, (ii)mayperformanyother function.”
58 There is also a contravention if the computer used to send theCEM is located inCanada.
See CASL, supra note 8, s. 12(1).
59 CAN-SPAM Act, supra note 16, s. 7704(a)(1).
60 ‘‘[T]he term ‘‘protected computer” means a computer—which is used in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside
the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or
communication of the United States.” See CAN-SPAMAct, supra note 16, s. 7702(13).
As in Canada, the intermediary which participates in the sending by furnishing the
telecommunication services (‘‘through an automatic technical process”) is not of
concern: CAN-SPAM Act, supra note 16, s. 7702(9), (15); CASL, supra note 8, s. 6(7).
61 Spam Act 2003, supra note 18, s. 16; EC Directive 2002/58/EC, supra note 48, s. 13.
62 OECD, supra note 2 at 9, ff27.
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implications of opt-in and opt-out: opt-in focuses legislative efforts on defining
the processes needed to manage the recipient’s consent, that is, the mechanisms
for obtaining, recording and revoking consent; opt-out emphasizes the choice of
the recipient not to receive further CEMs and how to make this choice
effective.63
The process of the opt-in approach as implemented under CASL will be
discussed hereafter. It should, however, be borne in mind that the ITU cautions
about some detrimental effects arising from a possible coexistence of opt-in and
opt-out models in neighboring markets such as Canada and the United States.
The warning recalls the usefulness of harmonization: ‘‘Variation in opt-in versus
opt-out approaches makes cross-border efforts hard since an offense in an opt-in
regime may be legal in an opt-out one.”64 Serious other constraints to cope with
are revealed by the OECD regarding the opt-out approach. These constraints
seem inimical to consumer protection:
. It transfers the burden of effort and cost to the consumer.
. In order to unsubscribe, the email must be opened and responded to,
which is contrary to good e-security practice, unless the e-mail is
from a known and trusted source.
. Unsubscribe links are often non-functional.
. It places the evidentiary burden upon the recipient of the message.65
The opt-in regime, where the recipient openly expresses consent, has its
advantages, notably in the area of privacy or by transferring the evidentiary
burden to the sender. But it remains just as limited, according to the OECD
outline which highlights issues regarding the means of recording consent and
freedom of expression:
. Difficulty in keeping records of consent received by business. The
absence of such records may significantly restrict the potential pool
of recipients who can be targeted for otherwise legitimate messaging.
. Restricts ‘‘commercial free speech”.
. Could result in devoting enforcement resources to areas where
consumers are not financially harmed.66
That said, the requirement of consent in the electronic context is not new to
Canadian law, and CASL forces coordination with previous Acts. For instance,
under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
(‘‘PIPEDA”),67 ‘‘[c]onsent is required for the collection of personal
information and the subsequent use or disclosure of this information.”68
63 ITU, supra note 20 at 17.
64 Ibid. at 27.
65 OECD, supra note 2 at 28.
66 Ibid.
67 PIPEDA, supra note 45, s. 3.
68 Ibid, Schedule 1, s. 4.3.1.
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Arrangements for consent under PIPEDA preempt any provision of any other
Act, in the absence of express derogation in the other Act.69 Such derogation was
unavoidable for CASL. The drafters explain that the narrower scope of the
CASL consent regime compared to PIPEDA involved a ‘‘coordinating
provision” (in this case, s. 2 of CASL) to give primacy to CASL over
incompatible provisions of PIPEDA.70 The earlier remarks of the Canadian Bar
Association (CBA) with respect to Bill C-27 (that became CASL) apply here. The
CBA deplored the legislative choice ‘‘to treat certain commercial online activity
differently and more restrictively than other commercial activity currently subject
to privacy laws.”71
Once consent is obtained, the sender must ensure that the CEM it is sending
reflects the minimum content required by CASL.
(b) Compulsory Content of the Commercial Electronic Message
Professor A. Oulaı̈ explains that in CASL, there is no obligation to identify
advertising specifically, as there is in French law.72 Relying on the professor’s
analysis, such an identification may be useful. It would allow a prompt
distinction (that is to say, on receipt of the messages) between advertising and
other content.73 CASL does not impose this duty with regard to advertising, nor
does it retain it for commercial messages in general. Conceivably, the
government instead seized the opportunity of prior consent to achieve the
objective of content identification, that is consumer information (for instance, s.
10(1)(a) of the Act requires that the purpose be disclosed for which consent is
sought). But even with this, content identification at the start would still be
useful. The debate on this matter, which has yet to be conducted regarding
CASL, has evolved to content labeling by keywords or abbreviations entered in
the subject line of messages. This proposal may have practical advantages,
according to an assessment by the OECD:
The utilization of specific wording, or labels, to allow users to
distinguish between advertising and other personal and professional
e-mail, could be useful in the fight against spam. In terms of e-mail,
labelling is the use of standard words in the message header or subject
line that clearly identifies the content of the message, for example, the
use of ‘‘ADV” for advertising and ‘‘ADLT” for adult content. Such a
69 Ibid, s. 4(3).
70 StandingCommittee supra note 28 at 1. See alsoCASL, supra note 8, s. 2. UnderUS law,
seeCAN-SPAMAct, supranote 16, s. 7701(b);DavidESorkin, ‘‘SpamLegislation in the
United States” (2003) Journal of Computer and Information Law 3 at 11; Katherine
Wong, ‘‘The Future of Spam Litigation after Omega World Travel v.Mummagraphics”
(2007) 2 H JL & Tech 459 at ff466.
71 Letter from the Canadian Bar Association to House of Commons Committee on
Industry, Science and Technology (15 September 2009) at 2-3, online: <www.cba.org/
CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=e0b11d52-7a58-40d1-9652-9871b80d8e7d>.
72 Oulaı̈, supra note 41 at 137. See also LEN, supra note 50, ss. 20, 21.
73 Ibid at 134.
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mechanism means that recipients are able to distinguish between
advertising material and other e-mail traffic. It would also enable the
more efficient and effective use of filtering systems.74
The CAN-SPAM Act adopts this labeling approach with respect to
commercial electronic messages containing sexually oriented material. The
prescription is strict; any person who initiates the transmission of a message of
this nature must include in the nineteen characters of the subject line, the specific
wording ‘‘SEXUALLY EXPLICIT:” in capital letters.75 In addition, U.S. law
prohibits rendering any of this material immediately visible upon opening the
message.76 But let us not forget the limits of content labeling or tagging. The
OECD, in particular, warns that its effectiveness remains subject to the
international harmonization of labels and a standardization of their use.77
Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission, responsible for the implementation of
the CAN-SPAM Act, is not convinced of the usefulness of the approach, at least
of the idea of extending tagging to all subjects. In a report to the U.S. Congress
published in 2005,78 the Commission denied one of the alleged main benefits. It
rejected the claim that labeling would facilitate content filtering and, ultimately,
contribute significantly to curb spam. The report shows compliance rates
altogether insignificant (‘‘two percent of email messages that the Commission
reviewed contained an ‘‘ADV” label in their subject lines.” 79). It suggests that
the experience of the American states which have chosen this legislative approach
is not conclusive.
But even though content labeling is not extended to all subjects, for the
apparent benefit of the U.S. marketing industry,80 the obligation remains for
anyone who wishes to initiate the transmission of a CEMM to make a clear and
conspicuous indication that the message is an advertisement or
solicitation.81Additionally, the initiator must not perform this transmission if it
has actual or constructive knowledge that the subject line of the message is likely
to induce error on the part of the recipient.82
74 OECD, supra note 2 at 33.
75 Requirement to place warning labels on commercial electronic mail that contains sexually
oriented material, 16 CFR s 316.4(a)(1) (2008). The regulator says: ‘‘The phrase
‘‘SEXUALLY-EXPLICIT” comprises 17 characters, including the dash between the
two words. The colon (:) and the space following the phrase are the 18th and 19th
characters.”
76 See: U.S. v. Impulse Media Group, CV05-1285RSL (W.D. Wash. 2007).
77 OECD, supra note 2 at 33.
78 Federal Trade Commission, Subject Line Labeling as a Weapon Against Spam: A CAN-
SPAM Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Federal Trade Commission, 2005) at 6.
79 Ibid.
80 Andrea Slane, ‘‘Home Is where the Internet Connection Is: Law, Spam and the
Protection of Personal Space” (2005) 2 U Ottawa L & Tech J. 255 at 279-280.
81 CAN-SPAM Act, supra note 16, s. 7704(a)(5)(i).
82 Ibid, s. 7704(a)(2).
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Under CASL, the focus is turned elsewhere. Attention is given to the
information in the hands of the recipient, which concerns three areas. The first
two are related to the identity and coordinates of the person sending the CEM
and, when applicable, that of those (such as affiliates) on behalf of whom the
CEM is sent (s. 6(2)(a)).83 As in U.S. law,84 it is about disclosing the origin of the
CEM. The sender must indicate its name, mailing address (including street
address, post office box, rural route, or general delivery), either the phone
number at which the recipient can access a service agent or a voice messaging
service, its e-mail, or website address. Contact information must remain valid for
at least 60 days after the CEM has been sent. 85 A minimum period of 30 days
was originally required and thus justified: ‘‘[t]o avoid having spammers change
their address every day, which they all otherwise do, the information [. . .] must
remain valid for at least 30 days after the commercial electronic message has been
sent.”86 ISED considers 60 days to be more reasonable to allow the recipient to
decide whether to continue receiving CEMs, withdraw consent, or report to the
CRTC when such consent is missing from the start. In the latter case, the delay
would allow the CRTC enough time to examine the claim.87
Thirdly, the sender must describe an unsubscribe mechanism, which is to say,
explain how or by what process the recipient can withdraw consent (s. 6(2)(c)).88
The provision of all such information must respect several formal conditions.
1.1.2.2 The Formal Conditions
It is permissible for the sender to display the required information (including
the unsubscribe mechanism) on a web page, in cases where it is not practicable to
insert it into the CEM.89 The web page must then be ‘‘readily accessible” and
available at ‘‘no cost.” As for the hyperlink to the information and the
information itself, the established standard commands a wording that is ‘‘clearly
and prominently” readable. A rough draft of CASL Regulations proposed to
circumscribe this obligation more strictly: accessibility of the web page was to be
provided as a single click, unless a method of equivalent efficiency was
employed.90 Nonetheless, references to the internet, via a web page, and to the
83 Intermediaries are not affected by these rules, that is to say, those whose primary
function is to facilitate CEMs distribution without influencing their content or
recipients’ choice. See Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commis-
sion, ‘‘Guidelines on the interpretation of the Electronic Commerce Protection
Regulations (CRTC),” Compliance Enforcement Information Bulletin CRTC 2012-
548 (Ottawa: CRTC, 2012).
84 See CAN-SPAM Act, supra note 16, ss. 7703, 7704.
85 Electronic Commerce Protection Regulations (CRTC), SOR/2012-36, s. 2(1). See also
CAN-SPAM Act, supra note 16, s. 7704(a)(5)(ii).
86 Debates of the Senate, supra note 19 at 1328.
87 ISED, supra note 43 at 29.
88 See Part 2.3 of this article.
89 SOR/2012-36, supra note 85, ss. 2(2), (3).
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click option had been criticized. It was argued that not all communication
terminals captured by CASL enable access to the internet, taking into account
technical or even purely circumstantial constraints. We think of a user whose
mobile device may technically access the internet, but the telecommunications
service to which he or she subscribes does not provide such access. This user
could well receive SMS (Short Message Service) CEMs but would ultimately be
unable to access the mandatory information if this information is displayed on a
web page to which the message refers. In addition, one could doubt the universal
nature of clicking, since it is incompatible with a number of communication
devices.91
While the CRTC welcomed these remarks, and had undertaken to rely on the
fact that ‘‘a more technology neutral wording is appropriate to accommodate the
different technology platforms available currently and in the future,”92 the
commission took out only the click (and methods of equivalent effectiveness) in
the final version of the Regulations. The reference to web pages remains, with a
pressing need, we believe, to clarify the meaning of the obligation to render such
pages ‘‘readily accessible.”93 The same word, readily, is used in conjunction with
the unsubscribe mechanism: not only must the sender describe this mechanism
clearly and prominently, but s. 3(2) of Regulation SOR/2012- 36 specifies that
the mechanism itself must be able to be ‘‘readily performed.” As will be discussed
further on, the CRTC is more eloquent in this regard, and perhaps its
interpretation94 could bring to life the meaning of this expression when
associated with web pages.
To summarize, CASL prohibits the sending of a CEM to an electronic
address, unless the recipient has given prior consent, as long as the message
allows the recipient to identify and communicate with the sender, in addition to
providing a compliant unsubscribe mechanism. These general requirements,
nevertheless, include several exclusions that are worth considering.
1.1.3 Excluded Messages
Certain exclusions are general (1.1.3.1); others are partial (1.1.3.2).
90 CanadianRadio-television and Telecommunications Commission, ‘‘Call for Comments
on Draft Electronic Commerce Protection Regulations (CRTC),” Telecom Notice of
Consultation CRTC 2011-400 (Ottawa: CRTC, 2011) Annex at s. 2(2).
91 Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, ‘‘Electronic Com-
merce Protection Regulations (CRTC),” Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2012-183
(Ottawa: CRTC, 2012) at para. 9.
92 Ibid, s. 21.
93 For further study of the concept of accessibility of contractual provisions in electronic
commerce, see Serge Kablan & Edward O Onana, ‘‘Le rituel du contrat électronique
entre mutation et orthodoxie” (2015) 1 Ottawa L Rev 63 at ff 108.
94 See Part 2.3 of this article.
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1.1.3.1 Messages Receiving a Full Exemption
It is not required to obtain the recipient’s prior consent, nor to disclose the
sender’s identity as prescribed or to comply with the unsubscribe mechanism
provisions, where a natural person sending a CEM has a personal or family
relationship with the recipient.95 This rule applies equally to any CEM that
constitutes solely an inquiry or application regarding the recipient’s commercial
activities, and certain other messages whose category and sending circumstances
are specified in the Regulations. These include a CEM sent from Canada where
the sender has reasonable grounds to believe that it will be accessed in a foreign
state covered by the Regulations;96 a CEM sent by or on behalf of a registered
charity, if the main objective is fundraising; and a CEM sent by or on behalf of
candidates or political organizations with the primary purpose of soliciting
political contributions, whether monetary or not.97
The last two exceptions were missing in the 2013 draft Regulations, drawing
the attention of some stakeholders, including the Association of Universities and
Colleges of Canada (now Universities Canada — UC). UC was concerned with
not being able to determine whether certain communications from universities in
the pursuit of their educational goals would be treated as spam.98 One way to
counter these uncertainties, UC submitted with limited success, would be to give
a full exemption to universities and charities. The association suggested as well
going beyond the current exemption for fundraising messaging and even
exceeding the solution set out in Australian Schedule I, which excludes messages
sent by educational institutions to specific groups, comprising students, alumni,
and household members.99
The exception for personal or family relationships also raises concerns. First,
as defined in the Governor General in Council Regulations, the sender and
recipient have family relationships if they are related to one another through
marriage, common-law partnership, or any legal parent-child relationship.
95 Section 6(5)(a)-(b) of CASL, supra note 8, also recall the exception of paragraph 7
regarding carriers that provide a telecommunications service to enable the transmission
of the message. Broadcasting companies (for everything related to broadcasting) are
exempted as well. Advertisements of these companies remain subject to the Broadcasting
Act (see CASL, supra note 8, s. 5).
96 Themessagemust nevertheless complywith anti-spam lawof that State. This lawmust be
analogous to CASL, which imposes on the sender a certain diligence. See Electronic
Commerce Protection Regulations, SOR/2013-221, Schedule 1.
97 Other CEMs are concerned. See SOR/2013-221, supra note 96, s. 3; CASL, supra note 8,
s. 6(8) (live voice telemarketing and telemarketing by facsimile. Currently governed by s.
41 of the Telecommunications Act, S.C. 1993, c. 38, these activities could later be subject
to CASL).
98 Such as recruiting students. See letter from Association of Universities and Colleges of
Canada to Industry Canada (4 February 2013).
99 SpamAct 2003, supranote 18, Schedule 1—Designated commercial electronicmessages,
s. 4.
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Moreover, the parties must have had a direct, voluntary two-way
communication.100 The original draft Regulations published on January 5,
2013, were more inclusive, encompassing individuals with common
grandparents, as well as uncles, aunts, cousins, nieces, and nephews.101
Secondly, as with family relationships, personal relationships assume a direct,
voluntary two-way communication. The personal nature of the relationship
should reasonably appear from these communications, taking into account
certain indicators, such as shared interests, experiences, opinions and
information, frequency of communications, the fact that parties may meet in
person, etc.102
Some authors are convinced that these requirements could render the
Canadian anti-spam law unconstitutional, because they make the Act too
restrictive. Professors Crowne and Provato, in particular, have reviewed CASL
in the light of s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the
‘‘Charter”).103 To them, the Act fails to pass this test, considering its effects on
communications and ordinary relationships and its impact in general.104
Section 2(b) of the Charter describes certain fundamental freedoms protected
by the Constitution: ‘‘Freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression,
including freedom of the press and other media of communication.” In light of
the case law of the Supreme Court of Canada,105 the authors claim that a CEM
under CASL constitutes an ‘‘expression” protected by the Charter.106 They then
set out to determine if CASL complies with s. 1 of the Charter, by checking if the
constraints that the Act imposes are ‘‘reasonable limits [. . .] as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”107 In its decision in R. v.
Oakes, the Supreme Court of Canada restates the cumulative criteria for
analysis, among which is the requirement that the legislation under scrutiny
‘‘should impair ‘as little as possible’ the right or freedom in question.”108 The
decision rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Central Hudson Gas
100 SOR/2013-221, supra note 96, s. 3(a).
101 Electronic Commerce Protection Regulations — Regulatory Impact Analysis State-
ment, (2013) C Gaz I 29 (see s. 2(a) of the draft regulations).
102 Ibid, s. 3(b).
103 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 UK, 1982, c. 11, s. 2(b) [Charter].
104 Emir Crowne & Stephanie Provato, ‘‘Canada’s Anti-Spam Legislation: A Constitu-
tional Analysis” (2014) 1 John Marshall J Info Tech & Privacy L 1.
105 The authors cite: IrwinToyLtd. v.Quebec (AttorneyGeneral), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, [1989]
S.C.J. No. 36, 1989 CarswellQue 115F, 1989 CarswellQue 115,15 A.C.W.S. (3d) 121
(S.C.C.); Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, 1988 CarswellQue
155F, 1988 CarswellQue 155, [1988] S.C.J. No. 88 (S.C.C.) [Ford]; Crowne & Provato,
supra note 104 at 12-13.
106 Ford, supra note 105, cited by Crowne & Provato, supra note 104. See especially para 59
of the judgment.
107 Charter, supra note 103, s. 1. See also Crowne & Provato, supra note 104 at 17.
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& Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York109 provides a
framework for comparative analysis, for deciding whether the CAN-SPAM Act
respects the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.110 Some authors hold
the belief that CAN-SPAM complies whith the First Amendment, on the ground
that it is no more restrictive than necessary: ‘‘the registry was narrowly tailored
because it restricted ‘only speech that contributes to the problems the
government seeks to redress.’”111
By contrast, according to Crowne and Provato, the way family relationships
are defined and organized under CASL clearly undermines this principle. As
rightly suggested, it can hardly be justified, even from the perspective of fighting
spam, that first cousins are by definition people with whom one has no ‘‘family
relationships.” Nonetheless, CASL limits freedom of expression accordingly by
making illicit any CEMs that are sent between first cousins, unless the prescribed
formalities are satisfied.112 This vision of family relationships is said to be so
narrow that it restricts communications and harmless ordinary relations,
prompting the authors to question the proportionality between these effects
and the objectives the law is pursuing. The definition of personal relationships is
similarly flawed because of its vagueness. Surprisingly, it derogates from the
principle of technology neutrality usually demonstrated by CASL. The authors
make the following assertion:
This definition is imprecise. It relies on a vague appeal to reason-
ableness and a series of non-limiting factors that appear to restrict
‘‘personal relationships” to only close friends. Thus, under CASL,
many friends, colleagues, and acquaintances will not fit within the
definition of acceptable recipients of communication [. . .] While CASL
is intended to be technologically neutral, the factor that examines
whether the parties have met in person is evidence that it still favors
traditional relationships over virtual ones. Thus, CASL has the
negative effect of restricting and hindering harmless communications,
potentially stunting social networking.113
We believe that the CRTC’s warning about social media does favor
traditional relationships. At least, the Commission doubts the strength of certain
relationships emerging from social media. It states for instance that ‘‘using social
media or sharing the same network does not necessarily reveal a personal
108 R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 1986 CarswellOnt 1001, 1986 CarswellOnt 95, [1986]
S.C.J. No. 7, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200 (S.C.C.), cited by Crowne & Provato, supra note 104.
109 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
110 Vivek Arora, ‘‘The CAN-SPAM Act: An Inadequate Attempt to Deal with a Growing
Problem” (2006) Colum JL & Soc Probs 299 at 305-306. See also: Jameel Harb, ‘‘White
Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. University of Texas at Austin: the CAN-SPAM Act & the
Limitations of Legislative Spam Controls” (2006) BTLJ 531 at 537.
111 Vivek Arora, supra note 101.
112 Crowne & Provato, supra note 104 at 17.
113 Ibid, at 18.
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relationship between individuals. The mere use of buttons available on social
media websites — such as clicking ‘‘like”, voting for or against a link or post,
accepting someone as a ‘‘Friend”, or clicking ‘‘Follow”— will generally be
insufficient to constitute a personal relationship.”114
While these restrictions to freedom of expression would likely be challenged,
the final impact of CASL is already substantially modified by the partial
exclusions it grants.
1.1.3.2 Partial Exemptions
For some CEMs, CASL removes the obligation to seek prior consent. These
CEMs must however comply with the other sending conditions, by providing
identification information about the sender and the unsubscribe mechanism.
Beneficiaries of this partial exclusion are CEMs falling within the circumstances
listed in s. 6(6)(a)-(f).115
This list is imported from U.S. law where it defines ‘‘transactional or
relationship messages.”116 The Canadian Regulations add to that list a CEM
following a referral.117 In this latter case, two conditions must be met. First, the
individual who recommends a party (e.g., a potential customer) to another
person (e.g., an online retailer who will eventually send the CEM) must have an
existing business, non-business, family, or personal relationship with both
parties. The potential customer must be a natural person and the exemption to
obtaining prior consent applies only to the first CEM sent by the retailer
following the referral. Second, this initial CEM must disclose the full name of the
person who made the referral (apparently, to allow the recipient to differentiate
the CEM from typical spam messages),118 and stipulate that the message follows
a referral. The Regulations do not clearly specify the aim of this first message,
except to say that it is for contact. A question remains whether it should be
designed to seek or confirm consent or for outright promotional purposes. In the
face of such ambiguity, senders would have every interest in favouring the latter
114 CRTC 2012-548, supra note 83.
115 That is, the response to a request for a price quote or estimate;messages that are intended
to facilitate, complete, or confirm a commercial operation that the recipients have
previously agreed to enter into;messages that provide informationonwarranties, recalls,
or safety for a good or service used or bought; messages that provide factual information
about an ongoing relationship (subscription, registration, account, loan, or similar
relationship); messages that provide information on the status of an employee of the
recipients or their beneficiaries;messageswhichdeliver a product/service under the terms
of a transaction the parties have previously entered into.
116 Under the CAN-SPAM Act, these messages are not considered as CEMMs. See supra
note 16, ss. 7702(2)(B), 7702(17): ‘‘The term ‘commercial electronicmailmessage’ does not
include a transactional or relationship message.” See also Primary purpose, 16 CFR s.
316.3(b)-(c) [2008]; U.S. v. Rad 559 Fed.Appx. 148 (Third Cir. 2014).
117 SOR/2013-221, supra note 96, s. 4(1).
118 Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, Canada supra note 101, s. 6 (proposed
exemptions to address stakeholder concerns).
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hypothesis, which is less restrictive, since it gives an opportunity to promote and
sell while mitigating the requirement of consent.
These rules have been criticized, and comments by parliamentarians like
Charmaine Borg are worth noting. The former member argued that the
provisions were contrary to the opt-in model promoted in CASL, which suggests
that one can not consent on behalf of a third party. Ms. Borg had detected a
weakness in this scheme, a risk of a certain abuse.119 On closer inspection, the
loophole in CASL seems real, even though only the first CEM following a
referral is exempt from consent. One expects that advertisers will quickly seize
the golden opportunity to do viral marketing.120 The reasoning is simple: under
CASL, one can not send a CEM without the recipient’s prior consent, and the
request for consent is itself regarded as a CEM and therefore subject to prior
consent; but the prior consent requirement is waived for the first CEM following
a referral. The consequence, perfectly embodied by viral marketing, is very likely:
urging existing customers (through discount offers, direct subsidies, etc.) to refer
potential customers from their respective networks (whether business, private,
family, or personal) to whom the first CEM would be sent. If these referrals are
successful, each new client could in turn provide new referrals, and the following
clients as well, extending the campaign into infinity, at least theoretically.
A referral is as simple as passing along to the advertiser the third party’s
contact information.121 It may be sufficient to use the tools of viral marketing.
We think of electronic forms to collect and forward e-mail addresses of the
referees (possibly without the referees’ knowledge).122 CASL is therefore, in the
end, closer to the U.S. CAN-SPAM Act in indirectly providing senders the
coveted ‘‘chance to initiate contact”!123 This outcome is surprising, given the
government’s initial choice to require consent and place the opt-in mechanism at
119 See letter from Ms. Charmaine Borg, former MP for Terrebonne — Blainville, to Mr.
Christian Paradis (8 February 2013) entitled ‘‘Antispam Regulations.”
120 Service public fédéral, économie, PME, classes moyennes et énergie, ‘‘La légalité du
marketing viral” Direction générale Régulation et Organisation duMarché (September
2005) (Belgium); see also: MS Poorvika & NV Kavitha, ‘‘A Study on Impact of Viral
Marketing on Consumers” (2014) 4 International Journal Of Marketing, Financial
Services & Management Research 150; J Phelps, et al, ‘‘Viral Marketing or Electronic
Word-of-MouthAdvertising: ExaminingConsumerResponses andMotivations to Pass
Along Email” (2004) Journal of Advertising Research 333.
121 Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, supra note 101, s. 4.
122 One may wonder if the disclosure of a third-party email addresses may violate the
provisions of other legislation. About that, it is worth recalling CASL, supra note 8, s. 2:
‘‘In the event of a conflict between a provision of this Act and a provision of Part 1 of the
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, the provision of this Act
operates despite the provision of that Part, to the extent of the conflict.”
123 The FTC announced new rule provisions on May 12, 2008. These provisions cover a
number of topics, including ‘‘Forward-to-a-Friend” Email Campaigns ‘‘in which
someone either receives a commercial e-mailmessage and forwards the e-mail to another
person, or uses a Web-based mechanism to forward a link to or copy of a Web page to
another person. The SBP explains that, as a general matter, if the seller offers something
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the heart of the regime. This choice involves two other matters that should be
understood before analyzing the mechanism of consent: transmission data and
computer programs.
1.2 Rules for Transmission Data and Computers
For simplicity, we study the rules for transmission data (1.2.1) before those
relating to computer programs (1.2.2).
1.2.1 Transmission Data
A second prohibition introduced by CASL relates to transmission data,
meaning signs, signals, symbols, or concepts regarding or necessary for the
transmission of a telecommunications service.124 Electronic addresses are among
these data, including the date and time which a message is sent, the size of any
attached file, the SMTP protocol used, the unique identification number of the
message, the IP addresses and service providers involved, the number of
attachments, etc.125
Section 7(1) prohibits the alteration of these data in the course of commercial
activities in a way that the corresponding message would be delivered to a
destination other than or in addition to that specified by the sender. It is
explained that the provision is intended to counter phenomena like pharming.
Pharming is an online fraud that involves altering CEM transmission data to
redirect parties to a malicious or illegitimate URL where, by deception, they are
induced to disclose their personal information.126 Here, the prohibition does not
apply to telecommunications service providers who modify transmission data for
purposes of network management (s. 7(2)). Similarly, alteration of transmission
data is permitted with express consent of the sender or recipient of the
corresponding message. The latter could give this consent, for example, by
allowing the message to be intercepted by an email filter.127 But there must be an
unsubscribe mechanism: ‘‘an electronic address to which [the person who gave
their consent] may send notice of the withdrawal of their consent.”128 Finally, the
alteration of transmission data is permissible if it is in accordance with a court
order.129
of value in exchange for forwarding a commercial message, the seller must comply with
theAct’s requirements, such as honoring opt-out requests.” See 16CFRpart 316 (2008).
124 CASL, supra note 8, s. 1(1).
125 For an illustration, see Google ‘‘Gmail Help—Trace an e-mail with its full headers,”
online: <support.google.com/mail/answer/29436?hl=en>.
126 ISED, supra note 43 at 36. See also: Gouvernement du Canada, ‘‘Risques de
cybersecurité,” online: <www.pensezcybersecurite.gc.ca/cnt/rsks/index-fr.aspx>.
127 Ibid.
128 See CASL, supra note 8, s. 11(4)(a).
129 Ibid, s. 7(1)(b).
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Under the CAN-SPAM Act, certain requirements on header information
aim to combat ‘‘fraud and related activity in connection with electronic mail,”
and, more specifically, predatory and abusive messages.130 The definition of
header information resembles that of transmission data in CASL. It includes
information that allows location of the source and the destination of an
electronic message. It also comprises routing information, the domain name and
address of origin, as well as ‘‘any other information that appears in the line
identification [identification field], or purporting to identify a person initiating
the message.”131 According to s. 4§7703(a)(3) of the Act, whoever materially
falsifies132 header information of more than 100 CEMMs during a 24-hour
period, more than 1,000 CEMMs in a 30-day period, or over 10,000 CEMMs
through a 1-year period, and intentionally initiates the transmission of these
messages, may be punished by fine and/or imprisonment. Header information is
materially falsified if the alteration impairs the ability to identify, locate, or
respond to the initiator of the CEMM or to investigate the alleged violation.133
Other provisions of U.S. law generally prohibit header information that is
materially false or misleading, such as when this information does not identify
accurately the protected computer134 used to transmit that message.135 The
initiator of a CEMM who knowingly uses another protected computer to relay
or retransmit the message so as to conceal its true origin and prevent any
communication back to him or her, is caught by this prohibition.136 This
particular situation is discussed in the case of Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures,
Inc., et al.,137 and the outcome will inevitably help to clarity the meaning of the
provision. In this case, to promote its services, the defendant (Power) initiated a
campaign that allowed users of the plaintiff (Facebook) to refer members of their
network. Following these referrals, invitation e-mails were sent to the prospects
from Facebook servers, suggesting that these messages, which use an address
including the extension @facebookmail.com, came from Facebook. The district
court ruled that this process contravened the CAN-SPAM Act. Header
information of the CEMMs was misleading, since it did not specifically
identify the actual initiator of these messages, nor did it allow the recipients to
communicate directly with him or her.138 The defendant, however, appealed this
130 CAN-SPAM Act, supra note 16, s. 7703.
131 Ibid, s. 7702 (8).
132 United States v. Kilbride, 507 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1064 (D. Ariz. 2007).
133 CAN-SPAMAct, supranote 16 s. 7703(d)(2). SeeU.S. v.Kilbride, 584F.3d 1240 (9thCir.
2009).
134 Supra note 58.
135 CAN-SPAM Act, supra note 16, s. 7704(a)(1).
136 Ibid, s. 7704(a)(1)(C), 7704(a)(6). Section 7704(a)(1)(A) mentions also the case where
certain information (the original address, for example) had been obtained fraudulently.
137 Facebook, Inc., v. Power Ventures, Inc., et al., United States District Court, N.D.
California, San Jose Division, No. C 08-05780 JW.
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verdict and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) filed an amicus brief in
support of the defendant.139 At the very least, the EFF claimed that the court
erred in adopting a purely technical approach, which deduces liability from mere
material error. Supported by various authorities,140 the EFF submitted that it
was necessary to assess the misleading nature of header information by taking
into consideration the general context of the CEMMs. For this purpose, the
relevant information (identity, contact information of the initiator, etc.,) must be
sought in the other elements of the message, such as the presence of an opt-out
option or the message text itself and any references it includes.141
The United States Court of Appeals held that the messages at issue were not
materially misleading.142 First, the court explained that within the meaning of
the CAN-SPAM Act, ‘‘more than one person may be considered to have initiated
a message.” In this action, it does appear that Power’s users, Power, and
Facebook all initiated the messages: ‘‘A Power user gave Power permission to
share a promotion, Power then accessed that user’s Facebook data, and
Facebook crafted and caused form e-mails to be sent to recipients.” The court
accordingly concluded that ‘‘Because Facebook (among others) initiated the
messages, the ‘from’ line accurately identified [Facebook as] a person who
initiated the messages.” Second, by design, the messages at issue did not impair
the ability of a reasonable recipient to contact or respond to the initiator.
All things considered, the reach of the CAN-SPAM Act remains broader
than that of Canadian law regarding header information, as the former governs
the alteration or falsification of this information as well as situations where it is
simply false or misleading.143
Furthermore, there is a relative difference between the two laws regarding the
prohibition pertaining to computers, including those used for the transmission of
CEMs/CEMMs.
138 Ibid at paras 12-13.
139 Ibid, (AmicusCuriae Brief of Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support ofDefendants-
Appellants) [EFF].
140 See Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc., 469 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2006)
[Omega], cited by EFF, ibid at 27.
141 Ibid at paras 27-28.
142 Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied,
138 S. Ct. 313, 199 L. Ed. 2d 206 (2017).
143 SeeOmega, supra note 140. (‘‘Inaccuracies in e-mail headers referring to non-functional
e-mail address as sender and an Internet domain not linked to sender did not make the
headers materially false or materially misleading and, therefore, did not violate [CAN-
SPAMAct].”); Silverstein v. Experienced Internet.com., Inc. 266 Fed.Appx. 678 (9th Cir.
2008) (e-mails’ use of domain name of professional networking website or of fictitious
‘‘from”nameswere notmaterially false ormisleading); Silverstein v.Keynetics, Inc., 2018
WL 1164715 (9th Cir, 2018).
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1.2.2 Computer Programs
Under the CAN-SPAM Act, it is an offense to gain unauthorized access to a
protected computer and initiate the transmission of multiple CEMMs by or from
this computer. The rule is stated as follows:
Whoever, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly—
(1) accesses a protected computer without authorization, and
intentionally initiates the transmission of multiple commercial
electronic mail messages from or through such computer, [. . .]
or conspires to do so, shall be punished as provided in
subsection (b).144
In substance, s. 8(1) of CASL remains close to this provision, although the
Canadian prohibition clearly distinguishes two activities, with a slightly wider
scope. First, s. 8(1) prohibits, within the framework of commercial activities, the
installation of a computer program in another person’s computer system, except
if the owner of the computer or an authorized user, such as an employee, has
given his or her express consent to this installation and is provided with an
unsubscribe mechanism.145 Secondly, CASL prohibits, under the same
conditions, the sending of a CEM from that computer system once the
program has been installed.
Obviously, the first activity excludes personal installations. Even so, whether
the computer program is used or could be used to send CEMs is irrelevant. The
letter of s. 8(1) suggests that the program is subject to the rigor of the law as soon
as its installation is considered to occur in the context of a commercial activity.
Parliament thus seems to insert into CASL a matter not necessarily related to
spam, as ‘‘computer program” is given the meaning of s. 342.1(2) of the Criminal
Code which includes without distinction all ‘‘computer data representing
instructions or statements that, when executed in a computer system, causes
the computer system to perform a function.” This is the case for softwares in
desktops or laptops, smart phones, smart watches, game consoles,146 smart
glasses, etc.147 The purview of the Act is, therefore, considerably expanded.
The other activity covered by s. 8(1) of CASL is closer to the spirit of s.
7704(a)(1) of CAN-SPAM Act.148 This is the sending of CEMs following the
installation of a computer program in another person’s computer system. Just as
144 CAN-SPAM Act, supra note 16, s. 7704(a)(1)-(2).
145 See Part 2.3 of this article. As for transmission data, the prohibition does not apply if the
installation is in accordance with a court order.
146 See, e.g., R. c. Hamel, 2011 QCCQ 11103, 2011 CarswellQue 10168 (C.Q.) at para 21.
147 In its judgmentR. v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, 2014 CSC 77, 2014 CarswellOnt 17202,
2014 CarswellOnt 17203, [2014] S.C.J. No. 77 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of Canada
deals with computers (in general) and these devices as similar devices or functional
equivalents (for some).
148 At least, if it is considered that sending a CEM from a protected third-party computer
may require the installation of a computer program.
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in the CAN-SPAM Act, through the definition of protected computer, a
requirement of territoriality exists in Canadian law. Section 8(1) of CASL is
contravened in each of the following three situations: first, when the computer
system is located in Canada at the time of the alleged acts; second, when the
perpetrator is in Canada at that time; third, when the perpetrator acts on the
instructions of a person who is in Canada at the time these instructions are
given.149
Up to this point, CASL seems not very different from the CAN-SPAM Act,
despite some differences in its scope. CASL takes a wide-ranging approach with
respect to CEM. This approach creates prohibitions that may transcend what is
necessary to fight spam, potentially exposing the Act to judicial challenges. The
CAN-SPAM Act enlarges its reach, in turn, regarding transmission data, but is
again surpassed by CASL with respect to computer programs. The U.S. law
keeps its focus on this point on fighting spam, unlike the Canadian law.
More fundamentally, both laws have in common the requirement of consent.
It is true that they frame commercial electronic messages from different
perspectives, with CASL subscribing to the opt-in model and the CAN-SPAM
Act to opt-out. But the exclusions provided by the Canadian Regulations,
particularly the one that authorizes the sending of CEMs following referrals,
impairs the effect of the regime intended by the creators of the law. As a result,
CASL indirectly offers senders the opportunity to initiate contact, just as is the
case under the CAN-SPAM Act. The ostensible strictness of CASL is thereby
greatly attenuated. One is reminded of the parody that once served to denounce
the CAN-SPAM Act: ‘‘You Can Spam Act.”150
It remains to be seen if the similarities between CASL and the CAN-SPAM
Act persist in the way they formulate the procedures for obtaining and managing
consent.
2. THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF CONSENT
Where consent is required for sending a commercial electronic message (s. 6
of CASL), altering transmission data (s. 7) or installing a computer program (s.
8), the will of the recipient must be explicitly stated (2.1). But consent can also be
implied under certain circumstances (2.2). In all cases, there must be an option to
unsubscribe or a mechanism for the person who has given his or her consent to
withdraw it (2.3).
2.1 Obtaining and Managing Express Consent
The CAN-SPAM Act uses the term affirmative consent with regard to
CEMMs. Section 15 USC 7702(1) provides this definition:
149 CASL, supra note 8, s. 8(2).
150 See, e.g., Steve Linford, ‘‘United States set to Legalize Spamming on January 1, 2004,”
SPAMHAUS (22 November 2003), online: <www.spamhaus.org/news/article/150/
united-states-set-to-legalize-spamming-on-january-1-2004>.
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AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT. —The term ‘‘affirmative consent”, when
used with respect to a commercial electronic mail message, means
that—(A) the recipient expressly consented to receive the message,
either in response to a clear and conspicuous request for such consent
or at the recipient’s own initiative; and (B) if the message is from a
party other than the party to which the recipient communicated such
consent, the recipient was given clear and conspicuous notice at the
time the consent was communicated that the recipient’s electronic mail
address could be transferred to such other party for the purpose of
initiating commercial electronic mail messages.
For its part, CASL does not directly define consent or express consent. It
gives more attention to the way it should be obtained. Nevertheless, a case
involving Google and its operating system, Android, shows that there may be
uncertainty about the meaning of consent, as in contexts involving mobile
communication apps.151 The case arose under PIPEDA, but since CASL finds
some of its roots in this Act, the example is still relevant.
Pursuant to Principle 4.3.3 laid out in Schedule 1 of PIPEDA, ‘‘An
organization shall not, as a condition of the supply of a product or service,
require an individual to consent to the collection, use, or disclosure of
information beyond that required to fulfil the explicitly specified and
legitimate purposes.” The complainant in the case alleged that Google had
compelled him to grant several ‘‘permissions” before he was able to use the app
Google Search. A number of these permissions, according to the complainant,
were not necessary for the use he intended for the app, such as to enable it to
place calls, send SMS, take pictures, make videos, etc. In its response, Google
explained, to the satisfaction of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of
Canada (hereinafter, the ‘‘Commissioner”), that ‘‘the permissions requested by
an app describe the app’s technical capabilities, and not necessarily its actual
behaviors.”152 The Commissioner could not conclude that the disputed
permissions added up to a consent that would allow Google to go above and
beyond what was necessary for its service. The conclusion is this:
In general, requiring a user to grant a permission to an app is not
equivalent to requiring that user to consent to the collection, use or
disclosure of the personal information associated with the permission.
As such, requiring agreement to a permission would not represent a
contravention of Principle 4.3.3 of the Act; however, nor would it
necessarily represent consent to any collection, use or disclosure of
personal information.153
151 Canada,Office of thePrivacyCommissioner, ‘‘Report ofFindings underPIPEDA,”No.
2014-008 (2014), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investiga-
tions/investigations-into-businesses/2014/pipeda-2014-008/>.
152 Ibid at para 68.
153 Ibid at para 69.
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If permission is not necessarily consent, it may be useful to seek certainty as to
the definition of consent, including under CASL. As in the U.S. (with the term
‘‘affirmative consent”), the French legislature engages in such clarification.
Section 22 of the LEN gives this definition of consent: ‘‘consent means any
expression of free, specific and informed will, by which a person agrees to the use
of his or her personal data for direct marketing purposes.” (Free translation).
With regard to formalities, pursuant to the age-old principle that requires an
informed decision, CASL directs the person seeking express consent under ss. 6,
7, and 8 to make his or her request under strict conditions as to substance and
form (2.1.1). Special terms apply to situations where the request is made on
behalf of a third party whose identity is unknown (2.1.2). Finally, there is
another peculiarity relating to computer programs (2.1.3).
2.1.1 The Wording of the Request for Consent
The first test any request for express consent must meet is standard, as
already set out in other legislation, such as PIPEDA. According to this Act, for
the collection of personal information to be lawful, not only must the purposes of
the collection be disclosed, but it is necessary for the person giving consent to
‘‘reasonably understand” these purposes.154 CASL establishes the same principle
in s. 10(a). It stipulates, in addition to the unsubscribe mechanism that must be
provided, the obligation for the entity seeking consent to disclose its identity and
contact details or those of the person on whose behalf consent is sought.155
The request for consent must use simple and clear words. The choice is left
whether the request is made orally, as in PIPEDA,156 on paper, or electronically
(e.g., by means of an electronic form). The alternative thus offered seems useful
to prevent the additional costs and frustrations that a solution requiring a written
form would have caused businesses and consumers.157 The first option
nevertheless raises the inevitable issue of proof of consent, which, fortunately,
the CRTC attempts to mitigate by admitting that the expression of will could be
ascertained or verified by an independent third party or by a ‘‘complete and
unedited audio recording of the consent.”158 These terms are reminiscent of the
CRTC Unsolicited Telecommunications Rules.159 In the second option,
especially when an electronic method is used to obtain consent, the relevant
information must be verifiable in order for the obligation to be validly
154 PIPEDA, supra note 45, Schedule 1, s. 4.3.2.
155 CASL, supra note 8, s. 10(1)(b); SOR 2012-36, supra note 85, s. 4.
156 PIPEDA, supra note 45, Appendix 1, para 4.3.7.
157 See CRTC 2012-183, supra note 91, s. 25.
158 CRTC 2012-548, supra note 83 at para 23.
159 Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, ‘‘Unsolicited Tele-
communicationsRules,” online:<crtc.gc.ca/eng/trules-reglest.htm>.SeePartVon the
express consent.
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fulfilled.160 Like the rules on unsolicited telecommunications, s. 13 of CASL
provides that the burden of proof is upon the person alleging consent.
A separate request for consent must be submitted for each of the three
activities covered by CASL (e.g., sending CEMs, altering transmission data,
installing computer programs).161 According to the CRTC Guidelines on the
Interpretation of the Electronic Commerce Protection Regulations, this
requirement does not mean that a new request is needed whenever an action
under one of the three activities is intended. Consent is more about each activity
considered as a whole: when a consumer gives consent for CEMs, this acceptance
applies to all specified CEMs, but does not allow alteration of transmission data
nor installation of computer programs. This is supposed to give the consumer the
opportunity to agree to be party to only one or two of these activities, unless he
or she accepts or rejects them all.162 In addition, in the interest of clarity, the
CRTC requires that the request for consent be presented separately from the
General Terms of Use or the General Terms of Sale.163 Thus, the consumer
would consent to be bound by these general conditions and, if necessary, consent
separately to each of the three activities of CASL. This idea of separate consent
was considered unreasonable and unnecessary by some stakeholders, but the
CRTC still believed in its relevance.164 In practice, however, the procedure of
online consent is considerably more onerous, mainly since electronic contracts
often involve acceptance of some additional clauses (distinct from the general
conditions).165 One has to wonder if this really protects the consumer.
To the request for express consent, the response of the consumer must use
actions that allow a positive or explicit manifestation of the will; it is not
sufficient, for example, to rely on pre-checked boxes presuming consent unless
stated otherwise.166 The CRTC has approved two techniques that are, however,
barely technologically neutral (therefore, difficult to apply to all communication
devices): on the one hand, checking a box before confirming an online
transaction (for example, the purchase of software); on the other hand,
entering one’s e-mail address in a dedicated field to express consent to receive
CEMs.167 To complete the process, an acknowledgment of receipt must be sent
to the person who gave consent.168 Moreover, the use of hyperlinks within the
160 CRTC 2012-548, supra note 83 at para 25.
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid at paras 14-15.
163 Ibid at para 16.
164 CRTC 2012-183, supra note 91, s. 27.
165 Kablan & Onana, supra note 93 at 105.
166 Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, ‘‘Guidelines on the
use of toggling as a means of obtaining express consent under Canada’s anti-spam
legislation,” Compliance and Enforcement Information Bulletin 2012-549 (Ottawa:
CRTC, 2012) at para 4.
167 Ibid at para 8.
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text mandating action from the consumer does not seem to matter. At least, the
CRTC guidelines allow the latter to be redirected to secondary pages where
useful information for the decision-making may be posted.169
2.1.2 Consent on Behalf of a Third Party
CASL addresses the instance where a person is seeking express consent on
behalf of another person whose identity is not known at the time of the
request.170 One can possibly equate the CASL provision with the principle of
affirmative consent of the CAN-SPAM Act indicated above.171 Consent in this
case (e.g., under U.S. law) covers the situation where, in the course of business,
the commercial electronic mail message originates from a party other than the
party to whom consent was first given. The recipient must have received a clear
and conspicuous notice, at the time consent was communicated, that his or her
electronic mail address could be transferred to the third party for the purpose of
initiating the sending of commercial electronic mail messages. These messages
must also comply with the other requirements (e.g., regarding identification of
the sender and the opt-out mechanism).172
Canadian law has some complex peculiarities (although the basic idea
remains the same as in the CAN-SPAM Act) when at least three parties are
involved: first, the person requesting express consent (for example, a marketing
firm); next, the recipient who consents; and finally, the third party on whose
behalf consent is sought and who is eventually entitled to rely on this consent
(‘‘the authorized person” or ‘‘partner”). The rights and obligations of these three
parties are strictly laid down in s. 10(2) of CASL and s. 5 of the Electronic
Commerce Protection Regulations.173 Foremost, the marketing firm seeking
express consent on behalf of an unidentified third party must reveal its own
identity. It may authorize any person or partner to use the resulting consent, on
the condition that its identity is established as the person who obtained the
original consent. Furthermore, the authorized person or partner who sends a
CEM in this context is required to identify itself and provide an unsubscribe
mechanism consistent with s. 11 of CASL.174
168 Ibid.
169 About the use of hyperlinks under s. 1435 of Québec Civil Code, Union des
consommateurs c. Dell Computer Corp., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, 2007 SCC 34, 2007
CarswellQue 6310, 2007 CarswellQue 6311, [2007] S.C.J. No. 34 (S.C.C.). The Supreme
Court of Canada ruled that a ‘‘clause that requires operations of such complexity that its
text is not reasonably accessible can not be considered as part of the contract.” See Serge
Kablan&Arthur, Oulaı̈ ‘‘La formalisation du devoir d’information dans les contrats de
cyberconsommation : analyse de la solution québécoise,” (2009)RDMcGill 627 at 658ff.
170 CASL, supra note 8, s. 10(2).
171 CAN-SPAM Act, supra note 16, s. 7702(1).
172 Ibid. See also s. 7704(a)(4)(B).
173 SOR /2013-221, supra note 96.
174 See Part 2.3 of this article.
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Communication between the person who obtains consent and the partners it
authorizes must be unhampered. The former ensures that the latter notify him as
soon as the recipient’s consent is withdrawn. Similarly, when receiving an
unsubscribe notice concerning an authorized partner, the person who obtained
consent must immediately notify this partner and comply with the request.175
Behind this (rather restrictive) set of rules, there is the purpose, certainly justified,
of protecting consumer privacy and allowing effective control over the use of a
person’s electronic address, even with regard to unknown third parties. The
obligation regarding the unsubscribe mechanism which must be both simple and
functional is consistent with this objective, the ultimate responsibility of which is
on the person seeking express consent.
2.1.3 The Case of Computer Programs
The following paragraph of the parliamentary proceedings is striking, as the
provisions on computer programs appeared to be innovative [though, reality is
more nuanced]:
What sets this spam legislation apart from everybody else’s is clauses 8
and 9, which are new pretty much to the world. Whereas we’ve learned
from the rest of the world, in this particular case the rest of the world
will be learning from us over the next few years.176
In particular, where it is mandatory to obtain express consent for the
installation of a computer program, or after installing or having installed such a
program in a computer system, for the sending of CEMs from that computer
system (s. 8(1)(a)),177 the person seeking consent must comply with a number of
175 CASL, supra note 8, s. 11(3). In an attempt to reassure the parties about these formalities
which, arguably, it knows are onerous, ISED felt compelled to make this clarification:
‘‘Some stakeholders expressed concern that these Regulations would require third
parties to allow the recipient to withdraw their consent to receive messages directly from
the personwho acquired the third-party consent. To be clear, there is no requirement for
the third parties to provide the opportunity to withdraw consent from all commercial
messages directly from the person who acquired consent; the requirement is limited to
removal of consent to receive messages from third parties.” See Industry Canada,
‘‘Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, Electronic Commerce Protection Regula-
tions,” online: <combattrelepourriel.gc.ca/eic/site/030.nsf/eng/00271.html>. Thus,
two contexts are distinguished: it is indeed possible that the person who obtained
express consent from the recipient on behalf of third parties whose identities were
unknownat the timeof the request (the first context)would have obtained separately, for
their own account, express consent to send CEMs to the same recipient (the second
context). Withdrawal of consent in the first context (consent obtained on behalf of third
parties) only affects that context and does not apply to the second context (consent
obtained on one’s own account). This allows the person involved to continue sending
CEMs to the recipient despite thewithdrawal, at least as long as consent is notwithdrawn
in the second context as well.
176 Standing Committee, supra note 38 at 6.
177 As with sending CEMs under s. 6, the scope of s. 8(1) includes a geographical restriction,
at least the need for link with Canada in order to apply. Thus, the person who, without
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additional requirements (that is, in addition to those set out in s. 10(1)).178 On the
one hand,179 the person seeking consent must ‘‘clearly and simply describe, in
general terms, the function and purpose of the computer program that is to be
installed if the consent is given.” (s. 10(3)).180 On the other hand, s. 10(4)
introduces specific requirements for any program intended to fulfill any one of
the functions listed in s. 10(5) of CASL or by the Regulations.181 According to s.
10(4), the person seeking express consent for the installation of such a program in
another person’s computer system, and who knows and intends that the program
will cause the computer to operate in a manner contrary to the reasonable
expectations of the owner or an authorized user, must: (1) describe the program’s
material elements that perform the functions listed and (2) bring these elements
to the recipient’s attention. Once again, this must be done ‘‘clearly and
prominently, and separately and apart from the license agreement.”
The formalities are even more restrictive: s. 5 of Regulation SOR/2012-36
stipulates that the computer program’s material elements performing the
specified functions must be brought to the attention of the recipient separately
from any other information provided in the request for consent. In addition, the
applicant has the obligation to obtain an ‘‘acknowledgement in writing” (either
on paper or electronically) from the recipient certifying that he or she
express consent, installs a computer program in another person’s computer, or which
sends a CEM by this computer after installing the program, violates the Act if: (1) the
computer is located in Canada at the time the acts were committed; (2) the perpetrator is
inCanada at that time; or (3) the perpetrator acts on the instructions of a personwho is in
Canada at the time he gives these instructions. See CASL, supra note 8, s. 8(2).
178 See Part 2.1.1 of this article on the formulation of the request for consent. CRTC 2012-
183, supra note 91, s. 4(e) is also applicable. This provision mandates the unsubscribe
mechanism.
179 Alongside information that may be specified by Regulations.
180 Under CASL, supra note 8, s. 10(7), it is not necessary to meet these requirements or the
requirements of s. 10(1) when updating a program initially installed or used with the
recipient’s express consent, if he is entitled to the update.
181 Namely: (a) collecting personal information stored on the computer system; (b)
interfering with the owner’s or an authorized user’s control of the computer system; (c)
changing or interfering with settings, preferences, or commands already installed or
stored on the computer systemwithout the knowledge of the owner or an authorized user
of the computer system; (d) changing or interfering with data that is stored on the
computer system in a manner that obstructs, interrupts, or interferes with lawful access
to or use of that data by the owner or an authorized user of the computer system; (e)
causing the computer system to communicate with another computer system, or other
device, without the authorization of the owner or an authorized user of the computer
system; (f) installing a computer program that may be activated by a third party without
the knowledge of the owner or an authorized user of the computer system; and (g)
performing any other function specified in the Regulations. The provision excludes
programs that, while performing any of these functions, are only intended to collect, use,
or disclose transmission data or performother operations prescribed by theRegulations.
See CASL, supra note 8, s. 10(6). CASL, supra note 8, s. 11(5) should be taken into
account.
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understands fully what is to be done to him or her. That is to say, the recipient
understands and agrees that the computer program will perform the functions
described in the request. One wonders how this will translate into practice, and
whether the software industry, or even the consumer himself, will keep up with
such rules. In the meantime, the CRTC describes the following implementation
procedure:
The Commission considers that an example of an acceptable means of
obtaining consent pursuant to section 5 of the Regulations would be an
icon or an empty toggle box, separate from the license agreement and
other requests for consent, that would need to be actively clicked or
checked, as applicable, in order to indicate consent to one, several, or
all of the functions listed in Section 10(5) of the Act, as applicable,
provided that the date, time, purpose, and manner of that consent is
stored in a database.182
It should be considered to what extent this procedure is compatible with
current technologies. From another angle, it is surprising that CASL assumes
express consent or, more precisely, decides that a person ‘‘is considered to
expressly consent” when the installation concerns computer programs such as
cookies, HTML code, or JavaScripts (s. 10(8)).183 In other countries, it is
different, and for good reason. In European law, for example, the request for
consent for the installation and reading of cookies is divided into two strictly
marked components: first, the complete information of the recipient, including
information about the specific functions of the program (in simple and
conspicuous terms, separately from the General Conditions or the Terms of
Service); second, the ability of the recipient to demonstrate, by a positive action,
willingness to accept or reject cookies.184 Furthermore, to minimize the risk (to
which one is necessarily exposed) of losing the record of the consent that was
given, the French authority for the protection of personal data, the Commission
Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL), limited to 13 months the
lifetime of cookies and, consequently, the lifetime of any associated consent. A
new request for consent is therefore needed after this period.185
The focus on these particular computer programs is explained as follows.
Cookies are routinely mentioned in association with consumer tracking,
profiling, and targeting.186 The 2015 Web Privacy Census by Altaweel, Good,
182 CRTC 2012-548, supra note 83 at para 31. ,
183 While the presumption justifiably applies to other programs (e.g. programs installed by
telecommunications service providers for the security of their networks or to correct a
defect in a computer), it seems especially problematic when it concerns ‘‘cookies” and
similar programs.
184 EC,Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic
communications sector, a) amended by 2009/136/EC [2002]OJL201 at art 5(3); inFrench
law: Loi no 78-17 de 6 janvier 1978, JO: 7 January 1978, 227, art 32(11).
185 See Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, online: <www.cnil.fr>.
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and Hoofnagle showed that together, the top 100 most popular websites placed
over 6,000 HTTP cookies on users’ computers when the users were merely
visiting their homepages.187 For many governments, alerting the consumer of the
phenomenon and, possibly, restoring some control over the consumer’s data,
seem to accord with an approach that favours consent given positively, not
assumed.
Although it deviates from this approach,188 notwithstanding the clearly
invasive nature of these programs, CASL sets out the following condition in s.
10(8)(b): the presumption of express consent is in effect if ‘‘the person’s conduct
is such that it is reasonable to believe that they consent to the program’s
installation.” Thus, a person who configures his or her computer to prohibit the
installation of these programs would rebut the presumption. But can one assume
that the average consumer knows how, technically, to block the installation of
Flash cookies or similar programs? Undoubtedly, a consumer with low digital
literacy will, by default, authorize installation of programs of which he or she
never suspected either the existence nor the tracking features.
All of that described, the Act distinguishes the situation of a ‘‘person
considered to expressly consent” from contexts of implied consent.
2.2 The Contexts of Implied Consent
Section 6 of CASL addresses implied consent. It may be recalled that under
this provision, it is prohibited to send a CEM, or to cause or permit a CEM to be
sent, to an electronic address, unless the recipient has consented to receive it.
Consent for this is either express or implied. When it is express, it follows the
previously analyzed provisions. Implied consent must fit one of the contexts of s.
10(9): this is the case when sending is in the interests of an existing business or
non-business relationship; or is consequential to the conspicuous publication of
the recipient’s electronic address, without restriction on unsolicited messages; or
186 For example: Meredith Whipple ‘‘Regulating Consumer Profiling: Going Beyond
Behavioral Advertising” (2013) LBJ J Public Affairs 89 at 90; see also M Ayenson et al,
‘‘Flash Cookies and Privacy II: Now with HTML5 and ETag Respawning” (2011)
[unpublished, online at<>]. Recital 30 of the new general regulation on the protection
of data states: ‘‘Individuals may be associated, by the devices, applications, tools and
protocols they use, online identifiers such as IP addresses and cookies (‘‘cookies”) or
other identifiers, e.g., radio frequency identification tags. These IDs can leave traces,
especially when combined with unique identifiers and other information received by the
servers can be used to create profiles of individuals and to identify these people.” See EC,
Regulation 2016/679 of the EuropeanParliament and of theCouncil of 27April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, [2016] OJ, L 119/1.
187 Ibrahim Altaweel, Nathaniel Good, & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, ‘‘Web Privacy Census,”
Technology Science, online: <techscience.org/a/2015121502>.
188 The manner of implementing the approach can obviously be problematic, given the
widespread use of cookies.
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following the recipient’s communication of his or her electronic address, again
without restriction regarding unsolicited messages.
The level of detail about some of the contexts of s. 10(9) is impressive, maybe
even excessive. For example, in defining an existing business relationship, the
legislation chooses an enumerative approach and lays out an inventory of
situations that appears to be exhaustive. However, this catalogue could, in
practice, only be indicative, given the lack of more precise criteria. Section 10(10)
explains that ‘‘existing business relationship” refers to a ‘‘business relationship”
arising from any of the five following situations:
(1) the purchase or lease of a ‘‘product, goods, a service, land or an interest or
right in land”;
(2) the bartering of one of these things;
(3) an ‘‘inquiry or application” about one of these things or a business
opportunity, investment, or gaming (the scope of the inquiry is not
otherwise specified, except for an indication that it may be a request for
information);
(4) the acceptance of such a business opportunity;
(5) any contract concluded in writing.
The relatively wide range of the fifth situation (any contract concluded in writing)
calls into question the usefulness of the list, at least partially. If any written
contract for anything is ultimately included, one wonders how helpful it is to
specifically list purchase, lease, bartering of goods, products, lands, etc. It may be
that these listed contracts are considered even if they are oral. But then, why only
them?
Another detail: the parties must be aware of not only one, but of two
separate time constraints, two years (24 months) and six months, to determine if
a business relationship is ‘‘existing.” The two-year period concerns a business
relationship resulting from the listed situations, except for an ‘‘inquiry or
application”, which is subject to the six-month period. The basis for this
distinction is not clear, nor is the choice of the terms of 24 and six months. In
practice, there is implied consent to sending a CEM, for example, when the
sender and recipient have entered into a contract (such as a purchase, lease, or
barter) and the contract is in force or has expired within two years preceding the
sending of the CEM.189 Where there is an ‘‘inquiry or application” for
information about a product, among other things, the parties are considered
to have a business relationship at the time the CEM is sent (and, therefore, the
sender had the recipient’s implied consent to send it) if the recipient sent an
inquiry or application for information within the six months preceding the CEM.
We would underline that a message that constitutes a response to such a request
189 The buyer of a business soldwhen it had an existing business relationshipwith a person is
deemed tohave abusiness relationshipwith that personwithin that company. SeeCASL,
supra note 8, s. 10(12).
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for information is excluded from the need for any consent (express or implied)
pursuant to s. 6(6).
A final enumeration, whose usefulness is marginal at best, offers a short list
of organizations which ‘‘are considered to be businesses,” and thus likely to have
business relationships: cooperatives and similarly described organizations.190 But
the term ‘‘commercial activity” is already subject to a definition sufficiently
broad to include these organizations.
Grasping the scope of an ‘‘existing non-business relationship” requires
parties to pay similar attention to a number of details. These relations concern
specific entities.191 As previously noted, a registered charity, a political party or
organization, or a candidate for a publicly elected office, is, in principle, excluded
from s. 6 of CASL when sending CEMs and, thus, from the formality of prior
consent.192 But this exclusion applies only where the main purpose of the
message is to raise funds for the charity’s activities or to seek contributions in
accordance with electoral law. In other situations, these entities remain subject to
CASL when sending a CEM and may benefit from invoking an existing non-
business relationship. CASL considers that such a relationship is ongoing where
the recipient offered the entity a gift or donation, volunteered for it, or adhered
to it (such as being accepted as a member) during the two years preceding the
CEM.193
As we will see in the last segment of our analysis, the technicality of these
rules and the possible implementation challenges they raise reflect on the
unsubscribe mechanism and the withdrawal of consent, which are two of the
essential pieces of the control the government intended to put in the hands of
consumers. One senses, nevertheless, a desire to add flexibility to a process that
operates in a diversified and quickly evolving technological context.
2.3 The Unsubscribe Mechanism and the Withdrawal of Consent
Consumers must be able to unsubscribe or withdraw their consent if already
given for an activity covered by CASL, that is, the sending of CEMs (s. 6(2)(c));
alteration of transmission data (s. 7(1)(a)); and installation of computer
programs (s. 8(1)(a)). The ‘‘unsubscribe mechanism” is mentioned with regard
to the first activity. Thus, the Act refers to a mechanism that would allow the
recipient to indicate, without charge, the wish to no longer receive any CEMs, or
a category of CEMs in particular, from the sender. Certain characteristics are
required of the mechanism under s. 11. If practicable, the electronic operation of
190 See CASL, supra note 8, s. 10(11).
191 Namely (1) a registered charity; (2) a political party or organization; (3) a candidate for a
publicly elected office; (4) a club, association or volunteer organization. SeeCASL, supra
note 8, s. 10(13)(c) and SOR 2013-221, supra note 96, s. 7.
192 SOR 2013-221, supra note 96, s. 3.
193 CASL, supra note 8, s. 10(14). Regarding club membership, association, etc., the two-
year period starts on the day the membership terminates. When the purchase or use is
spread out over time, the computation of time begins at the expiration of this period.
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the mechanism must be identical to those used to send the CEM. If not
practicable, the mechanism may be based on any suitable electronic method. In
addition, the mechanism should specify an electronic address or a link to a web
page where the consumer can indicate his or her wish. The address and link
should be active for at least 60 days after the transmission of the message. This
amount of time is justified as it ensures recipients enough time to unsubscribe
without imposing an excessive burden on businesses.194This period is shorter
under the CAN-SPAM Act: it is set at 30 days.195
Section 3(2) of Regulations CRTC 2012-183 provides that an unsubscribe
mechanism ‘‘must be able to be readily performed.196 In practice, this means that
the mechanism is ‘‘accessed without difficulty or delay, and should be simple,
quick, and easy for the consumer to use.”197 The CRTC states that responding to
a CEM by tapping the word ‘‘STOP” or ‘‘Unsubscribe,” in the case of short
message service (SMS), is an acceptable way to unsubscribe from receiving
CEMs. 198 The sender must respond to the wish to unsubscribe without delay,
not later than 10 working days after notification (s. 11(3) of CASL). Reading the
preparatory works of CASL, it appears that the 10-day period, which is the same
as that provided by the CAN-SPAM Act,199was added to accommodate the rare
companies whose updating of mailing lists is not yet automated.200
The Canadian legislation uses the term ‘‘withdrawal of consent” in relation
to the two other activities regulated by CASL (s. 11(4) and (5)). In the case of
alteration of transmission data, the withdrawal follows a ‘‘notice of withdrawal
of consent” and the sender of the CEMs must execute it promptly (i.e. within 10
working days after receiving it). The form and content of the notice are not
specified in the Act. We only know that an ‘‘electronic address” must be provided
where the notice can be sent at any time during the validity of the express
consent.
In the case of a computer program, withdrawal of consent takes the form of a
‘‘request to remove or disable” the program, which can also be sent to an
‘‘electronic address,” at any time during the year following installation. This
refers to a program whose functions are described in s. 10(5) of the Act
194 ISED, supra note 43; annotations of s. 11(2).
195 CAN-SPAMACT, supra note 16, s. 5(3). U.S. lawmakers will not impute to the sender a
temporary unavailability due to technical problems beyond its control, if these problems
are fixed within a reasonable time.
196 See Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunication Commission, ‘‘Undertaking:
Mr. Halazon and TCC,” File No. 9090-2015-00414 (12 June 2017), online:
<www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2017/ut170612.htm>.
197 CRTC 2012-548, supra note 83 at paras 11-12.
198 Ibid.
199 CAN-SPAM Act, supra note 16, s. 5(4)(A)(i).
200 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology,
Proceedings of theHouse and its committees, 40th Leg, 3rd sess,No 43 (2November 2010)
at 4.
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(collection of personal information; interference with the owner’s control of the
computer system, etc.) if the person who gave their express consent believes that
the functions, purposes, or impact of the program were not correctly described at
the time of consent. In this case, the person who had the express consent must
remove or disable the program as soon as possible, at no charge. It is an open
question whether the removal could be requested for other reasons.
CONCLUSION
A study by Professor Wall, Digital Realism and the Governance of Spam as
Cybercrime, is instructive regarding the impact of anti-spam laws.201 It puts into
perspective three legislative instruments enacted in 2002, 2003 and 2004: the
European Directive of July 12, 2002 on the protection of privacy in the electronic
communications sector; in Britain, the Privacy and Electronic Communications
(EC Directive) Regulations 2003, and the U.S. CAN-SPAM Act, in force in
2004. In the study, the overall levels of spam observed after the introduction of
these instruments reflect a heavy uptrend. CASL was also followed by a wave of
spam that allegedly has not been seen in the five years prior to enactment in
Canada.202 This raises the question of whether a legislative arsenal is relevant in
tackling spam. Further, Professor Wall’s study also shows a dramatic decline
(about 68 per cent) in spam levels from April-May 2004. However, we should
make no mistake: Professor Wall explains that this drop is not the result of a
delayed impact of the legislation, but a direct consequence of improved
technology, such as software whose main function is to prevent messages
identified as spam from reaching the inbox of users. A relatively low proportion
of spam managed to circumvent these filters over the period of the study.
If technology seems more effective in reducing the amount of spam, the role
of law is not to be neglected, as it transcends the issue of number of unsolicited
messages, according to Professor Wall:
[. . .] while the direct impact of law upon behavior may be limited, law
has nevertheless played an important, though not exclusive role in the
governance of spam. Under the ‘shadow of law,’ technology is effective
201 David S Wall, ‘‘Digital Realism and the Governance of Spam as Cybercrime” (2005) 4
EU J Crim Pol’y & Research 309 at 316.
202 KarimBenessaieh, ‘‘Laplus grosse vaguedepourriels en cinq ans,”LaPresse (14 octobre
2016), online: <www.lapresse.ca/techno/actualites/201610/14/01-5030339-la-plus-
gros-vague-de-pourriels-en-cinq-ans.php>. However, the 2017 report of the Standing
Committee on Industry, Science and Technology states that: ‘‘since the Act came into
force in 2014, Innovation, Science andEconomicDevelopmentCanada (ISED) observes
that the amount of spam originating from Canada has decreased by more than a third.
Moreover, while Canada figured among the top five spam-producing countries before
the Act came into force, it now no longer appears among the top 10 or even top 20.” The
organization immediately adds: ‘‘Whether the Act effectively reduced spam originating
from Canada is difficult to ascertain.” [citations omitted]. See Standing Committee,
supra note 8 at 8.
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in shaping the architecture(s) to reduce spam receipts, but its shadow
also strengthens social values against spammers and shapes the market
against them.203
Although ‘‘shaping the architectures” is not the immediate objective of CASL,
we believe that nothing prevents the agencies responsible for its implementation
from pushing stakeholders in this direction. This can be done, for instance, by
focusing on the communication protocol used for email, that is, the simple mail
transfer protocol (‘‘SMTP”). The idea of rewriting or enhancing this protocol to
screen out spam springs to mind.204
For the time being, the argument that CASL is the most stringent law in the
world in the fight against spam must be discarded. Our analysis does show a
breadth of scope, strict prohibitions, complex consent management procedures
(the implementation of which is certainly a challenge), two remedies for
infringement, and visibly severe penalties (ss. 20 and 51). On the one hand, the
statute authorizes an action administered by the CRTC with a penalty cap of $1
million for a violation by an individual and $10 million for any other person.205
CASL states that the penalty is not to punish but to promote compliance with
the Act.206 On the other hand, a private right of action (PRA) is provided to
allow any person claiming to be affected by an act or omission which constitutes
a violation of CASL or s. 5 of PIPEDA to apply to the court for an order against
its author.207 The court may order compensation in an amount equal to the
actual loss or damage suffered or expenses incurred and $200 per contravention
of s. 6 of CASL (about sending a CEM without prior consent) and up to $1
million per each day on which a contravention occurred. For contravention of s.
7 (concerning alteration of transmission data) and s. 8 of CASL (relating to
installation of computer program), the penalty may reach a maximum of $1
million for each day on which a contravention occurred.208 This PRA209 was to
203 Wall, supra note 200 at 12.
204 See: Federal Trade Commission, Effectiveness and Enforcement of the CAN-SPAM
Act: A Report to Congress, December 2005, at 18-19, online: <www.ifap.ru/pr/2005/
051223aa.pdf>.
205 CASL, supranote 8, s. 20(4).For comparison, see especiallyCAN-SPAMAct, supranote
16, s. 7(f)(3)(B): ‘‘For any violation of Section 5 (other than Section 5(a)(1)), the amount
determined under subparagraph (A) may not exceed $2,000,000. (C) The court may
increase a damage award to an amount equal to not more than three times the amount
otherwise available under this paragraph if [. . .].”
206 CASL, supra note 8, s. 20(2). Also, when an ‘‘offence” (non-compliance with a demand
pursuant to s. 15 or a notice issued under s. 17, or contravention of s. 19(4)) is committed
by a corporation, its officers, directors, agents or mandataries who directed, authorized,
assented or acquiesced to or participated in the offence are parties to and liable.
Similarly, a person is liable for the offence of their employee or agent during employment
ormandate.As a defense, they can prove that they have taken all due diligence to prevent
the offence. See CASL, supra note 8, ss. 42-46.
207 CASL, supra note 8, s. 47.
208 Ditto for contraventions of s. 9, subject to subparas (iv) and (v). Also s. 51(1)(iv)-(vii).
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come into effect on July 1, 2017. With less than a month to go, on June 7, 2017,
Canada announced that it was suspending its implementation. Apparently, it is
seeking a balance that CASL fails to guarantee in its current version:
Canadians deserve an effective law that protects them from spam and
other electronic threats that lead to harassment, identity theft and
fraud. At the same time, Canadian businesses, charities and non-profit
groups should not have to bear the burden of unnecessary red tape and
costs to comply with the legislation.
The Government supports a balanced approach that protects the
interests of consumers while eliminating any unintended consequences
for organizations that have legitimate reasons for communicating
electronically with Canadians.
For that reason, the Government will ask a parliamentary committee to
review the legislation, in keeping with the existing provisions of
CASL.210
The Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology
‘‘recommends that the Government of Canada further investigate the impact
of implementing the private right of action, once changes and clarifications have
been implemented to the Act and its regulations. At the same time, it could
consider if an award of damages should be based on proof of tangible harm.” 211
By indefinitely suspending these provisions, which are described as ‘‘the
toughest” of CASL, it has been said that Canada has, for all intents and
purposes, ‘‘declawed” the law.212
209 Under s. 7(g)(1) of the CAN-SPAM Act, supra note 16, action is open to ISPs ‘‘A
provider of Internet access service adversely affected by a violation of Section 5(a)(1),
5(b), or 5(d), or a pattern or practice that violates paragraph (2), (3), (4), or (5) of Section
5(a), may bring a civil action [. . .]”; See also s. 7(g)(3)(B): ‘‘For any violation of Section 5
(other than Section 5(a)(1)), the amount determined under subparagraph (A) may not
exceed $1,000,000. (C) The court may increase a damage award to an amount equal to
not more than three times the amount otherwise available under this paragraph if [. . .].”
See also Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2009) [Gordon]; Xmission,
L.C. v. Adknowledge, Inc.,No. 2:15-CV-00277, 2016WL 3746528 (D. Utah 2016), citing
Gordon: ‘‘Plaintiff lacked standing to bring a private action for CAN-SPAMbecause no
real harmwas suffered and Plaintiff did ‘‘not fit any reasonable definition of an ‘Internet
access service’”;Gordon v. John 1-10Does 459Fed.Appx. 681(9thCir, 2011): ‘‘Consumer
who had received unsolicited commercial email or spam from marketers was not an
‘internet access provider,’ as required to have standing to bring suit underCAN—SPAM
Act.”
210 Innovation, Science and EconomicDevelopment Canada, NewsRelease, ‘‘Government
of Canada suspends lawsuit provision in anti-spam legislation” (7 June 2017), online:
<www.canada.ca/en/innovation-science-economic-development/news/2017/06/gov-
ernment_of_canadasuspendslawsuitprovisioninanti-spamlegislati.html>.
211 Standing Committee, supra note 8 at 4 (Recommendation 10).
212 Jean-François Codère, ‘‘Ottawa dégriffe la loi antipourriel,” La Presse (8 juin 2017),
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To us, other choices of the government also significantly moderate the
purported strictness of the Act. There is, of course, the exemption for CEMs
following a referral. Through it, the Canadian legislation moves away from the
opt-in approach and therefore brings CASL closer to the U.S. CAN-SPAM Act.
It indirectly provides senders with a golden opportunity to initiate contact,
perhaps to try to sell. Since the U.S. anti-spam law was criticized for being
permissive, it is strange to see CASL follow its path although this brings some
homogeneity in the rules governing their neighbouring markets. On another
note, some definitions may face judicial review, such as the restrictive definition
of family relationships. The provisions about computer programs, which initially
appeared innovative, also moderate the purported strictness of CASL; especially
the indulgence they convey about cookies and other tracers, matters that still
create concern for other governments.
After all, it is our view that CASL’s objective to enhance consumer
protection is highly laudable. Hopefully, the ongoing review of the provisions
and operation of the Act will lead to some amendments consistent with this aim.
online: <www.lapresse.ca/techno/internet/201706/08/01-5105492-ottawa-degriffe-la-
loi-antipourriel.php>.
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